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THE CONTINUING DRIFT OF FEDERAL SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY JURISPRUDENCE
GREGORY C. SISK*
ABSTRACT

With the enduringdoctrine of federal sovereign immunity, it is too
late in the day to suggest that the United States should be treatedas
an ordinaryparty in the federal courts. Yet as the Supreme Court
has become more comfortable with the increasingly common encounter with a statutory waiver of immunity, the rigidity of interpretive approach has eased. An early jaundiced judicial attitude has
resolved into a greaterrespect for the legislativepromise of relief to
those harmed by their government. After sketching the history of
statutory waivers over the past century-and-a-halfand examining
Supreme Court decisions across the decades, this Article maintains
that a coherent and principled jurisprudence of federal sovereign
immunity has been gradually emerging. The Court now reserves
absolute jurisdictional analysis for verifying the existence of a
statutory waiver for a general class of claims, while judiciously
employing strict constructionto precludejudicial implicationof new
causes of actionsor remedies. By contrast, the Court is more inclined
to use ordinary modes of statutory construction when examining
other standards,limitations,or exceptions in statutorywaivers, even
presuming that procedural rules apply in government cases in the
same manner as in private litigation. Unfortunately, a recent
Supreme Court decision resurrected an old line of cases that
translated a statute of limitations for certain claims against the
* Orestes A. Brownson Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law
(Minnesota). Sisk is the author of a treatise and a law school casebook on litigation with the
federal government and was co-counsel with Jeffrey Haynes for the petitioner before the
Supreme Court in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008). The
author thanks Scott Dodson, Stephen Feldman, Harold Krent, Thomas Mengler, John
Copeland Nagle, and Robert Rasmussen for their valuable comments on an earlier draft, and
his research assistant, Pamela Abbate, for her editorial and cite-checking support.
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United States into ajurisdictionalrule. This Article suggests that the
negative effect of this decision on the course of the law, although not
negligible, is limited by the decision's reliance on stare decisis. This
Article concludes that the Court should speak more purposively to its
interpretiveapproachin the future if the renewed drift in its federal
sovereign immunity jurisprudenceis to be arrested.
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INTRODUCTION

In its 2008 decision in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States,' the Supreme Court addressed a question that seemingly
only a lawyer could love (or care about): whether the statute of
limitations governing non-tort money claims against the federal
government in the United States Court of Federal Claims is
jurisdictional. In other words, is this an ordinary statute of
limitations, that is, an affirmative defense and a procedural time
constraint that may be waived or forfeited by the government? Or
is this instead a special and absolute rule of subject matter jurisdiction, one that cannot be relinquished and indeed that must be raised
by the court on its own motion, even if both the claimant and the
government agree that the lawsuit was timely filed?
Resolving whether a statute of limitations on claims against the
federal government is jurisdictional or waivable sounds like an
esoteric legal inquisition. But this seemingly abstruse query
implicates the broader and more fundamental question of how
strictly or generously the courts should regard statutes enacted by
Congress that yield the sovereign immunity of the United States
and open the courthouse doors to claims by the governed against
their government. Even after the government has waived its
sovereign immunity for a particular category of claims, does the
citizen who seeks judicial redress for a governmental wrong still
have a steep hill to climb, with every word of text and every term of
the statute being slanted against the claimant?2 Should the courts
regard suits against the sovereign as "suspect, even when allowed,"
pursuant to a parsimonious canon of strict construction?3 Do the
rules of construction for statutory waivers "load the dice for or

1. 128 S.Ct. 750 (2008).
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Claims Court at the Crossroads,40 CATH. U. L. REV. 517,
517-18 (1991) (referring to the traditional "story of sovereign immunity," which "includes the
principle that waivers of sovereign immunity will be strictly construed").
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against a particular result,"4 the upshot being that the government
usually wins?
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has drifted toward a
jurisprudential approach that, while carefully protecting governmental policymaking prerogatives when considering the nature and
extent of liability by the government, upholds the statutory promise
of an individual judicial remedy for official wrongdoing. An early
jaundiced judicial attitude has resolved into a greater respect for the
legislative pledge of relief to those harmed by their government.
Under this coalescing interpretive regime, jurisdictional analysis is
increasingly confined to the core questions of the existence and basic
capacity of a consent to suit.5 The traditional rule of strict construction in favor of the sovereign has become more attentively focused
upon the general scope of the waiver in terms of the cause of action
and remedy allowed against the government.6 As the distance grows
between a statutory standard or limitation and the core substance
of the waiver, presumptions in favor of the government fade and
statutory construction assumes an ordinary shape.7 Indeed, the
Court has adopted a rebuttable presumption that procedural rules,
including statutes of limitation, are to be applied in the same
manner as among private parties, with no special solicitude for the
government.8
Under the Supreme Court's modern interpretive approach to
statutory waivers of federal sovereign immunity, section 2501 of
Title 28 of the United States Code 9 -the statute of limitations for
money claims in the Court of Federal Claims at issue in John R.
Sand-might have offered an easy case for a less rigid reading and
for classification under the general rule that the time limitation
should be applied in accordance with the same rules that govern
private litigation."° The plain language of the statute suggests that
4. ANTONIN SCAuA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 27-28 (1997) (generally criticizing
preferential rules and presumptions of strict or liberal construction that detract from a focus
on text).
5. See infra Part II.B.3.
6. See infraPart II.C.
7. See infraPart II.C.3.
8. See infra Part II.D.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2000).
10. See infra Part III.A.
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the jurisdictional inquiry is to be completed separately before
application of the time limitation: "Every claim of which the United
States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred
unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim
first accrues."" The legislative history when the predecessor statute
was enacted in 1863 indicates that members of Congress expected
this statute of limitations to apply to the government in the same
manner as to private parties. 2 The contemporary legal understanding at the time of enactment was that a statute of limitations was
a waivable defense. 3 Indeed, Congress had selected language from
typical state statutes of limitations of the period, thus drafting
§ 2501 to be what the Supreme Court later called an "unexceptional"
statute of limitations. 4
In deciding the John R. Sand case, the Court disagreed with none
of these points on the merits. Nonetheless, a majority held that the
statute of limitations had jurisdictional force, requiring a court to
"raise on its own the timeliness of a lawsuit filed in the Court of
Federal Claims, despite the Government's waiver of the issue. '' 5
The Court's decision was premised squarely and exclusively on the
principle of stare decisis.' 6 The majority adhered to a nineteenth
century line of cases from a very early stage in the Court's sovereign
immunity jurisprudence that reflected a rigid jurisdictional
disposition toward then-novel legislation affording a judicial remedy
against the federal government. 7 The majority acknowledged that
the Court's more recent decisions "represent a turn in the course
of the law" and further admitted that the contrasting lines of
case authority reinforced by its decision in John R. Sand may
create an "anomaly" in the case law. 8 But the majority believed
that the resulting conflict was not "critical" and did not produce
"'unworkable' law" so as to justify overturning supposedly well-

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

28 U.S.C. § 2501 (emphasis added).
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 145 (2002).
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 752 (2008).
Id. at 753-57.
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the early cases).
John R. Sand, 128 S. Ct. at 756.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:517

settled precedent.19 Two justices dissented, agreeing both that the
jurisdictional rule reaffirmed by the majority had been abandoned
in prior decisions and that any ambiguity in the case law "ought to
be resolved in favor of clarifying the law, rather than preserving an
anachronism whose doctrinal underpinnings were discarded years
ago. 2 0
Whither, then, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on statutory
waivers of sovereign immunity? In so many ways in recent decades,
the Supreme Court has moved beyond a narrow and restrictive
posture toward such statutes that sometimes defeated congressional intent.21 The Court has developed a more mature and refined
approach toward the increasingly common judicial encounter with
statutes authorizing suit against the federal government.2 2 In
dissent, Justice Stevens feared that the John R. Sand decision
might "revive the confusion" of that earlier jurisprudence.2 3 More
optimistically, John R. Sand may come to be identified as what
Justice Stevens characterized as "a carve-out" from the modern
approach for those specific statutory provisions that had been the
subject of early Supreme Court decisions with a different interpretive attitude.2 4
Even if John R. Sand proves to be only a bump on the road
toward a principled and coherent regime for interpretation and
application of statutory waivers of federal sovereign immunity, it
nonetheless is a big bump that threatens to rip off the muffler and
make for a very noisy ride in the near future. 25 Because a money
suit in the Court of Federal Claims is the vehicle for a large category
of important claims against the federal government-suits to be
compensated for takings of property under the Fifth Amendment,
certain contract disputes, breach of trust claims by Indian tribes,
military employment claims, etc. 2 6 -an exception from the general
trend of sovereign immunity jurisprudence for these claims creates
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 759 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 759-60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.C.2.
John R. Sand, 128 S. Ct. at 759 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 758.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra text accompanying notes 476-78.
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a large gap in the doctrine. And because so many questions of
statutory construction in suits against the United States remain to
be definitively decided, the Supreme Court's John R. Sand decision
likely presages a new era of disputation in the courts, even if the
Supreme Court in the end wanders back onto the path that it had
followed for decades before this stare decisis-justified detour.
In the very context of sovereign immunity and the discordant
notes sounded by inconsistent decisions in this area of the law,
Justice Frankfurter wrote half a century ago that "[t]here comes a
time when the general considerations underlying each specific
situation must be exposed in order to bring the too unruly instances
into more fruitful harmony."2 Taking up Justice Frankfurter's
suggestion here by examining the 150-year history of statutory
waivers of sovereign immunity2 9 and the changing course of the
Supreme Court's decisions across those decades,3" this Article
endeavors to "take soundings in order to know where we are and
whither we are going."3 1 Although the John R. Sand decision may
have set the Court's federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence back
adrift just as it appeared to have found its way to a secure anchorage, the current of case law may be strong enough to bring it back
to port.

I. THE CONCEPT AND WAIVER OF FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. The Conceptual Grounding,Persistent Criticism, and
Perseveranceof the Doctrine of FederalSovereign Immunity
From the founding of our nation, the mantle of sovereign
immunity has rested uneasily on a government designed to be
limited in powers and understood to draw its authority from the
people.32 Rather than requiring consent by the government before
27. See infra Part III.C.
28. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682,706 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
29. See infra Part I.
30. See infra Part II.
31. Larson, 337 U.S. at 706.
32. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208-09 (1882) (criticizing the general doctrine
of federal sovereign immunity as grounded on a mistaken analogy to the English system,
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enduring suit by its citizens, the opposite might have been assumed
with respect to a government that depends upon the consent of the
governed.3 3 Akhil Amar writes that "in America, neither federal
institutions nor state governments were truly sovereign," but rather
"[o]nly the people were," so that a government "could not, properly
speaking, claim a sovereign's immunity." 4 Susan Randall contends
that "the founding generation did not intend state sovereign
immunity and instead viewed the ratification of the Constitution as
consent to Article III suits by the states individually and collectively
for the United States."3 Because Article III expressly defines the
judicial power to include "Controversies to which the United States
shall be a party,"36 she argues that the authority for claims to be
pursued in court against the federal government was granted in the
founding charter itself.3"
At the same time, the emergence of something like sovereign
immunity probably was inevitable, at least as a clear point of
departure for developing a refined policy and practice of government
liability in court to private complainants. Although casting off the
autocracy of historical monarchy and being grounded instead upon
democratic approval, the United States is a sovereign government,
empowered to act for the collective good in an authoritative manner,
distinct from any private individual or private organization.3 8
Although its powers are granted pursuant to a written Constitution
and its agents are beholden to a greater or lesser extent to an
electorate, the executive and legislative branches do possess powers
of government that may and sometimes must be exercised, despite
the objections of a particular individual who may be aggrieved by
saying that "[u]nder our system the people, who are [in England] called subjects, are the
sovereign'.
33. See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 650 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing
sovereign immunity as "plac[ing] the advantage with an all-powerful Government, not with
the citizen'.
34. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 335 (2005).
35. Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1, 3
(2002).
36. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
37. See Randall, supra note 35, at 38.
38. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 226 (1882) (Gray, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the "maxim" of sovereign immunity "isnot limited to a monarchy, but is of equal force
in a republic" because "it is essential to the common defence and general welfare").
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such actions.39 As Alexander Hamilton wrote in The FederalistNo.
81 while urging ratification of the Constitution, "[i]t is inherent in
the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent."0° Likewise, John Marshall, who
would later become Chief Justice of the United States, assured the
Virginia ratifying convention that "[iut is not rational to suppose
that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court."41
The question of the legitimacy of sovereign immunity in a
democratic society is inextricably intertwined with the two-centuryold American question of the proper role of the judiciary in resolving
disputes that implicate the public policy choices made by officials in
the political branches of the government. In this respect, Harold
Krent explains sovereign immunity as "deriv[ing] not from the
infallibility of the state but from a desire to maintain a proper
balance among the branches of the federal government, and from a
proper commitment to majoritarian rule."42 The moral claim of those
injured by government wrongdoing (or even as collateral damage to
the proper workings of government) is not to be ignored. But the
legal authority for redressing that harm resides with the political
branches of government, at least initially in determining whether
to extend a judicial venue. And "[iun determining whether waiver is
appropriate," Krent writes, "Congress plausibly may conclude that
the potential harm to majoritarian policymaking from damage
actions outweighs the benefits in added deterrence of tortious
conduct by the government, increased efficiency in contracting, and
'
more equitable compensation of injured parties."43

39. See Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1868) (claiming that "but for
the protection which [sovereign immunity) affords, the government would be unable to
perform the various duties for which it was created"). But see Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign
Immunity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 383, 395 (1970) (arguing that "from the standpoint of
sound legal engineering, we do not need a doctrine of sovereign immunity as a judicial tool,"
because the judiciary may be trusted to remain within legal limits defined by scope of review
and judicial competence).
40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
41. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 555 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888).
42. Harold J. Krent, ReconceptualizingSovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1530
(1992).
43. Id. at 1531.
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In any event, uneasily and awkwardly but quite definitively, the
concept of sovereign immunity has attached firmly to the United
States government. Scholars may continue to debate "[w]hether
federal sovereign immunity and its jurisprudential cousin, state
sovereign immunity, were accepted premises underlying-or instead
intended casualties of-the ratification of the United States
Constitution."" Sovereign immunity may be deprecated by some as
"a legal anachronism canonized as a legal maxim"4 5 that persists
only as a matter of "historical accident, habit, a natural tendency to
favor the familiar, and inertia."4 Or instead the concept may be
defended by others as "stem[ming] from concerns for preserving
majoritarian policymaking and not from any need to honor hoary
traditions."4 7 Since at least its 1821 decision in Cohens v. Virginia,48
the Supreme Court has embraced the sovereign immunity principle
that the United States may not be sued without its consent as the
"universally received opinion."4 9 In sum, as Laurence Tribe says,
"the doctrine of sovereign immunity is in no danger of falling out of
official favor any time soon."5 °

44. Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA.
L. REv. 439,443 (2005); see also Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and NonstatutoryReview
of FederalAdministrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 867, 867 (1970) ("Since the end of the last century, learned members of the legal
profession have been continuously attacking the roots and branches of that judicially planted
growth [sovereign immunity]."). For a critical review of the ongoing debate on the
justifications for the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Katherine Florey, Sovereign
Immunity's Penumbras: Common Law, "Accident," and Policy in the Development of the
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2008); see also Kurt
Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Principle of Strict
Construction,50 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (discussing founding-era sentiments
of sovereign immunity).
45. Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1924).
46. Davis, supra note 39, at 384.
47. Krent, supra note 42, at 1531.
48. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
49. Id. at 411-12.
50. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-25, at 520 (3d ed. 2000).
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B. A History of Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity
Reserving a central place for statutory waivers, Vicki Jackson
describes sovereign immunity as "a place of contest between
important values of constitutionalism":
On the one hand, constitutionalism entails a commitment that
government should be limited by law and accountable under law
for the protection of fundamental rights; if the "essence of civil
liberty" is that the law provide remedies for violations of rights,
immunizing government from ordinary remedies is in considerable tension with all but the most formalist understandings of
law and rights. On the other hand, a commitment to democratic
decisionmaking may underlie judicial hesitation about applying
the ordinary law of remedies to afford access to the public fisc to
satisfy private claims, in the absence of clear legislative authorization.51
By virtue of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, when seeking as a
nation to resolve the imperative question of how to uphold individual rights and remedies while preserving democratic rule, Harold
Krent explains that "we trust Congress, unlike any other entity, to
set the rules of the game."52 Under the doctrine of federal sovereign
immunity as it has evolved in Supreme Court jurisprudence over
the past 200 years,5 3 the amenability of the federal government to
legal action in court turns upon consent by the government,
expressed through legislation enacted by a democratically elected
congress.
As suggested above, sovereign immunity--or something like
it-may have been an inevitable legal development, because openended and unconstrained access to the courts by those who object
to governmental policies or actions could undermine effective
governance by the people through an electoral majority. Ideally
then, sovereign immunity should be a level foundation upon which
Congress may construct a statutory regime that establishes
51. Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the FederalGovernment:Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial
Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. IN'L L. REV. 521, 521 (2003) (citations omitted).
52. Krent, supra note 42, at 1531.
53. On the evolution of the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity in the Supreme Court,
see generally Sisk, supra note 44, at 446-56.

530

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:517

government accountability in court for carefully designed remedies,
balanced by well-justified policy limitations. 4 When policy initiatives are most prominently presented, public concerns perhaps
should not bow to private complaints, and judicial authority
appropriately may be withheld.5 5 But when mundane government
activity is involved, devoid of policy implications, we should expect
legislative waivers to be readily adopted.5 6
Unfortunately, during more than two centuries of American
history under our Constitution, Congress has often proven to be an
indolent builder of a regime for governmental accountability in
court, leaving the foundation bare for decades and then slowly
adding a wall at a time, with large breaks of time in between, and
only reaching a stage of rough completion in the last few decades.
The work of Congress in authorizing suit against the sovereign is
summarized in the next several subparts of this Article.
1. The Originof Statutory Waivers: Contracts, Money, and the
Court of Claims
Three quarters of a century passed after the ratification of the
Constitution before Congress enacted the first significant grant of
permission by the sovereign United States to its citizens to seek
relief against it in the courts.5" In 1855, Congress created the United
States Court of Claims and conferred upon it limited authority to
hear claims against the United States founded upon federal

54. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 333 (2000)
(describing sovereign immunity as a "background structural understanding" that may be
surrendered "only on the basis of a judgment to that effect by the national legislature").
55. See Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of FederalAdministrative Action: The
Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction,and Parties
Defendant, 68 MACH. L. REv. 387, 415 (1970) ("ITihe application of the sovereign immunity
doctrine should rest on whether the benefits of judicial review of administrative action are
outweighed by the possible interference with governmental programs that may result from
the grant of relief.").
56. Krent, supra note 42, at 1529-33; see also Sisk, supra note 44, at 442.
57. For a discussion of the various administrative and legislative claim processes that
were developed in these early years of the Republic, as well as the increasing burdens imposed
on administrators and members of Congress, together with episodes of injustice and
corruption, see William M. Wiecek, The Origin of the United States Court of Claims, 20
ADMIN. L. REv. 387 (1968).
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statutes, regulations, and contracts. 58 Prior to 1855, individuals with
contract or other monetary claims against the federal government
had been barred by sovereign immunity from seeking redress in
court, and thus were left to petition Congress to enact legislation-in the form of "private bills"-appropriating funds to pay
those claims. 9 The Court of Claims originally had authority only to
recommend that Congress pay claims, thereby serving as an advisor
to Congress on the merits of such claims.6 ° President Lincoln urged
Congress to give the "power of making judgments final" to the Court
of Claims, arguing that "[i]t is as much the duty of Government to
render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to
administer the same between private individuals."'" In 1863,
Congress granted the Court of Claims power to make binding and
final judgments, with appellate review by the Supreme Court.62
In 1886, Virginia Representative John Randolph Tucker, a former
law professor and future dean of the Washington & Lee Law School,
introduced a bill in Congress to revise the jurisdiction and procedures of the Court of Claims and to replace the earlier 1855 and
1863 statutes.6 3 The Tucker Act, 4 enacted in 1887, confirmed the
powers and nationwide jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over
money claims (other than in tort) based upon federal statutes,
executive regulations, and contract, and expanded that court's
authority to include actions based upon the Constitution. 65 Moreover, the Tucker Act granted the then-circuit courts (what today are
58. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. On the creation of the Court of Claims and
the waiver of sovereign immunity for money claims against the United States, see generally
GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 4.02(a)-(c) (4th ed. 2006).

59. See Richard H. Seamon, Separationof Powers and the SeparateTreatment of Contract
Claims Against the Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43 VILL. L. REV. 155, 175
(1998).
60. See Michael F. Noone, Jr. & Urban A. Lester, Defining Tucker Act JurisdictionAfter
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 571, 575 (1991); see also Wiecek, supra note 57,
at 397.
61. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 2 (1861).
62. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, §§ 3, 5, 12 Stat. 765.
63. H.R. 6974, 49th Cong. (1886); see 18 CONG. REc. 597, 622-24 (1887); 17 CONG. REC.
2424, 2454 (1886). On the enactment of the Tucker Act, see generally United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 213 (1983).
64. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.).
65. For discussion of the constitutionally-founded category of claims under the Tucker Act
as it evolved in the Supreme Court, see infra Part II.C.2.
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the district courts) concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims
over monetary claims not exceeding $10,000.66 With certain
structural modifications, 7 the substance of the Tucker Act and the
jurisdictional authority of what is now called the Court of Federal
Claims has been remarkably stable during the past century and
remains the "foundation stone" in the adjudication of non-tort
money claims against the United States.6"
Although the enactment of the Tucker Act and its predecessor
statutes certainly was a major step forward after a decades-long
delay in congressional attention to affording individual justice
through a judicial remedy for governmental wrongs, the immediate
motivation for the government may have been self-interest as much
as social justice. Harold Krent explains that the pre-Civil War
waiver of immunity from contract suit was "viewed as indispensable
to the efficient operation of government, for without it, qualified
private contractors might not undertake government projects and
the government could not obtain the goods and services it needed at
affordable prices." 9 Nonetheless, while no one suggests that the
Tucker Act was a pure act of governmental altruism, Gillian
Hadfield emphasizes that the waiver of sovereign immunity in
contract cases served not only practical ends but promoted democratic principles:
The ability of the sovereign to bind itself in contract has been an
important step in the evolution of the modern democratic state.
Through the use of contracts, government has been able to
perform its functions more effectively by drawing on private
resources to deliver governmental goods and services. Politically,
66. The concurrent jurisdiction of the district courts over 'Little" Tucker Act claims not
exceeding $10,000 is codified today at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2000). See infra note 166 and
accompanying text.
67. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25,
bifurcated the original Court of Claims into two separate but related judicial entities.
Congress established the slightly renamed United States Claims Court as the trial court for
Tucker Act claims, and then created the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit to hear appeals involving these and other claims. FCIA §§ 105(a), 133(a). In 1992, the
Claims Court was renamed the "United States Court of Federal Claims." Federal Courts
Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516.
68. C. Stanley Dees, The Future of the Contract Disputes Act: Is It Time To Roll Back
Sovereign Immunity?, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 545, 546 (1999).
69. Krent, supra note 42, at 1564-65.
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by honoring its contracts, government has reinforced its
democratic legitimacy as a government subject to the rule of
law.7"

2. The Decades of Slow Growth of Statutory Waivers: Admiralty
and Tort

Neither before the creation of the Court of Claims in 1855 nor for
another six decades afterward did Congress afford a judicial remedy
for personal injuries or property damage caused by the negligent or
other wrongful conduct of government instrumentalities and
agents.7 1 Even then, the initial consent to suit for such harms was
limited to the narrow category of maritime jurisdiction. More than
ninety years elapsed between congressional consent to suit in
contract and creation of a general federal cause of action in tort
against the federal government. As had been true with the move
to lower the shield of immunity in contract,7 2 Congress's belated
opening of the courthouse doors to tort claims was motivated in
part by governmental self-interest-in this instance, the growing
frustration over the mechanism of legislative enactment of private
bills to address claims of tortious wrongdoing by the government.73
Enacted in 1920, the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA)74 was the first
significant waiver of federal sovereign immunity that included a

70. Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract: Damages for Breach of Contract by
Government, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 467, 467 (1999).
71. On the evolution of remedies for torts committed by the government or public officials,
see generally PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT ch.2 (1983).
72. See supra Part I.B.1.
73. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950) ('The volume of these private
bills, the inadequacy of congressional machinery for determination of facts, the importunities
to which claimants subjected members of Congress, and the capricious results, led to a strong
demand that claims for tort wrongs be submitted to adjudication.").
74. Act of Mar. 9, 1920, ch. 95, § 2, 41 Stat. 525, 525-26. In 2006, the Suits in Admiralty
Act was reclassified and revised by Congress, as part of the completion of the recodification
of statutes and enactment of Title 46 of the United States Code as positive law. Pub. L. No.
109-304, § 6(c), 120 Stat. 1485, 1509 (2006). The reorganization and recodification was not
intended to change the existing legal principles governing admiralty claims against the
United States. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-170, at 2 (2006) (explaining that the reorganization and
restatement of laws now to be codified in Title 46 "codifies existing law rather than creating
new law").
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judicial remedy for tortious injuries.7 5 The SIAA, as revised today,
provides in pertinent part:
In a case in which, if a vessel were privately owned or operated,
or if cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private
person or property were involved, a civil action in admiralty
could be maintained, a civil action in admiralty in personam
may be brought against the United States or a federally-owned
corporation. 76
The SIAA does not create any new rights to recovery, but rather
waives the sovereign immunity of the United States to impose the
same liability that would be visited by general admiralty law upon
a private shipowner:
[T]he Suits in Admiralty Act does not itself provide a cause of
action against the United States. Instead, it only acts as a
waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States in
admiralty suits. Thus, the act merely provides a jurisdictional
hook upon which to hang a traditional admiralty claim. 7
Following legislative consent to admiralty-based claims, two-anda-half decades would pass before Congress allowed suit by those
who had suffered tortious injury at the hands of their government
other than on navigable waters. Before 1946, the only means of
recovery from the government for injury in tort was a private bill
enacted by Congress through the ordinary legislative process. 78 As
both a matter of equity to citizens and to relieve itself of the burden
of considering a multitude of private bills, Congress finally passed
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946. 7 ' As the Supreme
Court later explained:

75. A similar predecessor statute had been enacted in 1916. Shipping Act of Sept. 7, 1916,
ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728.
76. 46 U.S.C. § 30,903(a) (2000).
77. Trautman v. Buck Steber, Inc., 693 F.2d 440,443-44 (5th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).
78. See Dierdre G. Brau, Alternatives to the JudiciallyPromulgated Feres Doctrine, 192
MIL. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (2007).
79. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842, 843 (enacted as Title IV of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946).
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[The FTCA] was the offspring of a feeling that the Government
should assume the obligation to pay damages for the misfeasance of employees in carrying out its work. And the private bill
device was notoriously clumsy. Some simplified recovery
procedure for the mass of claims was imperative. This Act was
Congress' solution, affording instead easy and simple access to
the federal courts for torts within its scope. 0
As it happens, the FTCA was enacted just months after a collision
between an aircraft and the highest landmark in New York City, an
episode that was shocking to the people of the time and that also
resonates with our recent national experience. 8 As described by
historian Stanley Weintraub:
What war might have been like to Americans had enemy
technology [in World War II] a little more time to develop came
home to New Yorkers when, at 9:49 A.M. on a misty Saturday
morning [July 28, 1945], the equivalent of an unguided missile
struck the Empire State Building, tallest in the world, 915 feet
above street level. A B-25 "Mitchell" bomber, the type of twinengine plane used for the Doolittle raid on Tokyo in April 1942,
lost in blinding fog as it flew west from Squantum Army Air
Force Base in Massachusetts, crashed into the seventy-ninth
floor and engulfed two stricken floors in fire from its fuel tanks.8 2
The horrors that follow when a large airplane strikes the tallest
building in a major city became all too familiar to modern day
Americans with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001. Fortunately, on the prior 1945 occasion of an
airplane-building encounter, fewer people than usual were in the
Empire State Building because it was not a weekday; 3 nonetheless,
ten people on the ground, in addition to the flight crew of the
American military aircraft, lost their lives, others were injured, and
substantial property damage resulted.'I
80. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1953) (citations omitted); see also 1-2
LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 2.01 (2007).
81. See 1-2 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 80, § 2.01.
82. STANLEY WEINTRAUB, THE LAST GREAT VICTORY: THE END OF WORLD WAR II,
JULY/AUGUST 1945, at 294 (1995).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Lester Jayson and Robert Longstreth, the authors of a treatise
on the Federal Tort Claims Act, note that, despite the obvious
culpability of the military for the 1945 incident, "[tihe victims of this
frightful accident must have been shocked to learn later from their
attorneys that there was no judicial remedy available to them
through which they could recover damages from the United States
Government. The doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit provided
an insurmountable barrier."8 Although the Empire State Building
incident was not the actual impetus for the enactment of the FTCA
(which had been pending in Congress for more than two decades),'
the statute was made retroactive to 1945, thus allowing the victims
of that crash to seek recovery, and indeed they were among the first
to file suit under the new statute.8 7
Although today dozens of statutes authorize claims against the
government for personal injury or property damage arising from
specific programs and generally limited to small claims,8 8 the FTCA
is the most comprehensive and commonly invoked waiver of federal
sovereign immunity for tort claims.8 9 The FTCA grants United
States District Courts
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages, accruing on and after
January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred.'
Thus, the United States is liable under the FTCA on the same basis
and to the same extent as recovery would be allowed for a tort
85. 1-2 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 80, § 2.01.
86. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953).
87. See Comm'rs of the State Ins. Fund v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 549, 551-52
(S.D.N.Y. 1947).
88. 1-2 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 80, §§ 1.01-1.02.
89. SISK, supra note 58, § 3.02, at 104.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000). For further discussion of the FTCA and its construction
by the Supreme Court, see infra Parts II.B.3 and II.C.3.
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committed under like circumstances by a private person in that
state. 91
While the FTCA does waive federal sovereign immunity for tort
claims generally, the United States remains the beneficiary of
several special rules and protections, notably including restrictions
on the standards of liability (such as the exclusion of strict
liability);9" numerous defined exceptions to liability that bar certain
types of claims (such as claims for assault, libel, misrepresentation,
and interference with contract)9 3 and preclude liability arising out
of certain governmental activities (including discretionary or
policymaking functions, 94 transmission of mail,95 and military
combat);9 6 restrictions on damages available (precluding prejudgment interest and punitive damages);9 7 and the exclusion of certain
categories of people (federal civilian employees covered by a
compensation act 98 and military servicemembers injured incident
to service)99 from eligibility to seek a damages remedy under the

FTCA.

91. See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43,44 (2005). On the standards for liability under
the FTCA, including the analogy of the government to a private person, see generally SISK,
supra note 58, § 3.05, at 124-40.
92. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 797-803 (1972) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1),
making the government liable for the "negligent or wrongful act or omission" of any
government employee, as encompassing only fault-based causes of action, such as negligence
or intentional wrongdoing). On the exclusion of strict liability, see generally SISK, supra note
58, § 3.05(d), at 138.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000). On the exceptions for certain claims, see generally SISK,
supra note 58, § 3.06(c)-(d), at 154-62.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000). On the discretionary function exception, see generally SISK,
supra note 58, § 3.06(b), at 141-54.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (2000). For discussion of the mail carriage exception as construed
by the Supreme Court, see infra Part II.C.3.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 26806) (2000).
97. Id. § 2674 (2000). On damages under the FTCA, see generally SISK, supra note 58, §
3.07, at 167-70.
98. Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (2000). On the exclusion
from the FTCA of federal civilian employees covered by the Federal Employees Compensation
Act, see generally SISK, supra note 58, § 3.08(b), at 170-77.
99. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-46 (1950) (holding that claims by
military personnel for injuries sustained incident to service should be excluded from the
FTCA). On the Feres doctrine, see generally SISK, supra note 58, § 3.08(c), at 177-87.
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3. The Modern Accelerationof Statutory Waivers: From
Employment Discriminationto Attorney's Fees
During the past three decades, the move away from sovereign
immunity as a blanket exemption for the government and toward
allowing individualized justice in a judicial forum for most categories of claims against the federal government has accelerated. As
discussed below, this last stage in congressional enactment of
waivers of sovereign immunity began with employment discrimination and open government laws in the early 1970s, continued with
environmental protection statutes in the 1970s, included expanded
access to the courts for benefits claims into the 1990s, and culminated with the broad extension of attorney's fee-shifting throughout
this period.
Although the federal government did not initially hold itself
subject to judicial action when it enacted laws prohibiting employment discrimination by private employers, the injustice of denying
equal protection in employment to federal employees was recognized within only a few years, resulting in much swifter legislative
consent to suit than had occurred during earlier periods of American
history. When originally enacted in 1964, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act provided no judicial remedy for employment discrimination by the federal government because the federal government is
excluded from the definition of employer for purposes of the main
antidiscrimination provisions in the Act. 100 In 1972, however,
Congress expressly waived the sovereign immunity of the federal
government for employment discrimination claims within the scope
of Title VI-not by changing the definition of employer, but instead
by adding a new and separate section of the statute for the federal
government.' Under this provision, the federal government as an
employer is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race,
10 2
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) (providing that "[t]he term 'employer'... does not include[ ] the United States, [or] a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United
States").
101. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2000)). On the history of employment discrimination claims
against the United States, see generally Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S.
820, 824-33 (1976).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2000).
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Similarly, in 1974, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)'0° was extended to federal employees. 10 4 As with Title VII,
rather than simply incorporating federal employees within the Act's
existing provisions, Congress added a new section applicable to
federal employees." °5 Although the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 1' enacted by Congress in 1990, specifically excludes the
federal government from the coverage of the statute, 10 7 federal
employees continue to receive protection from disabilities-related
discrimination through the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,108 which
requires federal agencies to accommodate disabled persons'0 9 and
prohibits discrimination against an "otherwise qualified individual
with a disability.""' The Rehabilitation Act adopts the same procedures that apply to federal employees under Title VII.111 Thus, the
case law arising under the ADA will generally also apply to
Rehabilitation Act claims by federal employees." 2
During this fertile period for statutory waivers of sovereign
immunity, Congress also added causes of action that are unique to
a governmental entity, such as the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)113 which authorizes court suits demanding access to government information. Under FOIA, initially enacted in 1966,114 the
federal government is obliged to make information available to "any
person" upon simple request." 5 As for judicial relief, the FOIA
provides that if the agency fails to release requested information,
the requester may bring suit and seek a court injunction to disclose the documents." 6 The burden is on the government to justify
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
104. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(b)(2), 88 Stat. 74 (1974).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 633a.
106. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-213 (2000)).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5)(B). For decisions holding that federal employees have no remedy
under the ADA, see Mannie v. Potter, 394 F.3d 977, 982 (7th Cir. 2005), and Rivera v.
Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 1998).
108. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-795n (2000)).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b).
110. Id. § 794(a).
111. Id. § 794a(a)(1). See generally MACK A. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION IN A NUTSHELL 322 (4th ed. 1999).
112. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
114. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966).
115. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
116. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
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nondisclosure, by showing that the information falls within the nine
exemptions from disclosure."' If a plaintiff substantially prevails on
a FOIA claim, the statute authorizes an award of attorney's fees." 8
As a further demonstration of the present-day congressional
amenability to lowering the shield of sovereign immunity, in
December 2007, Congress amended the FOIA to expand the
circumstances under which an award of attorney's fees is appropriate to include not only a judicial order, but also when there is "a
voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency,""' 9 that is,
when the requester's lawsuit served as a catalyst in bringing about
disclosure by the agency.
With greater vigor beginning in the 1970s, Congress has regulated private activities that negatively impact the environment,
including provisions for civil actions against those who violate
environmental protection rules. Simultaneously, Congress has made
the federal government amenable to suit under environmental
protection laws. First, citizens may initiate judicial action or review
to challenge the government in its capacity as a regulator, contending that the government has failed to fulfill its statutory obligations
0 Absent
or has improperly implemented an environmental statute. 12
a specific judicial review provision in a particular environmental
statute, general judicial review of agency action also is available
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),12 ' which itself
contains a broad waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United
States for specific relief other than money damages. 122 Second,
citizens may challenge the government in its capacity as a polluter
or an actor whose conduct threatens the environment. 2 3 Citizen suit
provisions, including those in the Clean Water Act and the Clean
Air Act, allow individuals to bring action against any personexpressly including the United States-alleged to be in violation of

117. Id. § 552(b).
118. Id. § 552(a)(4)(E).
119. Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 4(a)(2), 121 Stat. 2525, 2525 (2007).
120. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a)(2), 1369(b) (2000); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7604(a)(1)-(2), 7607(b) (2000).
121. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000).
122. Id. § 702.
123. See generally MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS § 2.08, at 2-18 to
-22 (2d ed. 1993).
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environmental restrictions. 2 4 Moreover, these citizen suit authorizations "are accompanied by separate 'federal facilities' provisions
waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States and making
federal facilities subject to state and federal pollution control laws
to the same extent as 'any nongovernmental entity."'1 25
Applicants for governmental benefits long have had access to
judicial review, with a key exception that proved to be one of the last
plates of the government's sovereign immunity armor to be shattered. For decades, judicial review has been authorized to challenge
administrative denials of disability benefits under the Social
Security Act,' 26 one of the largest classes of court claims against the
federal government. But, historically, military veterans who sought
benefits for service-connected disabilities encountered an absolute
bar of sovereign immunity.'2 7 From the time of the first significant
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity with the authorization of
contract claims before the Civil War,'28 Congress had expressly
withheld access to the courts from veterans.'29 As Robert Rabin had
observed, the Veterans' Administration stood in "splendid isolation
as the single federal administrative agency whose major functions
[were] explicitly insulated from judicial review.' 130 Not until 1988,
through the Veterans' Judicial Review Act, did Congress finally
drop the sovereign immunity shield.'3 ' Not only did Congress then
124. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2000).
125. AXLINE, supra note 123, § 2.08, at 2-18 (quoting "federal facilities" provisions in the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)); see also Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (2000);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (2000); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)
(2000).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000).
127. Steven W. Feldman, United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, in WEST'S
FEDERAL FORMS § 13,401, at 616-27 (perm ed., rev. vol. 2002). On the historical story of
veterans claims and the bar of sovereign immunity, see generally Gregory C. Sisk, The Trial
Courts of the Federal Circuit:Diversity by Design, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 241, 259-63 (2004).
128. See supra Part I.B.1.
129. Stephen Van Dolsen, Note, Judicial Review of Allegedly Ultra Vires Actions of the
Veterans'Administration:Does 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) PrecludeReview?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 579,
594 (1987).
130. Robert L. Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims for
Veterans' Benefits: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 905, 905 (1975); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 100-963, at 10 (1988), as reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5791 (quoting Rabin,
supra at 905).
131. Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
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reverse the prohibition on judicial review, it created a new forum
that today is called the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans

Claims. 132
As the culmination (for the moment at least) of the modern
congressional movement to lift the curtain of federal sovereign
immunity, the United States has regularly included itself in the
proliferating number of statutes that shift attorney's fees to those
who succeed in litigation. Although "Congress began cautiously,
waiving federal sovereign immunity for attorney's fees only with
respect to claims made under selected statutes that protect
fundamental rights, 13 3 such as Title VII employment discrimination
claims,' Congress subsequently broadened consent to awards of
attorney's fees to prevailing parties under other civil rights
statutes, 135 environmental statutes,136 and FOIA."3 v This "trend
against immunity from fee awards reached its crescendo with the
enactment of the Equal Access to Justice Act, which puts the
government on equal footing with private defendants for fee-shifting
and further makes the government liable
in fees whenever its
38
position is not substantially justified."
4. The Broad Tapestry of Statutory Authorizationsfor Suit
Against the Federal Government
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the past century and a
half has witnessed "the progressive relaxation by legislative
enactments of the rigor of the immunity rule."'3 9 Today, there is a
general presumption that the federal government should be held
responsible for its obligations and accountable for its mistakes and
132. Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, § 511, 112 Stat.
3315, 3341 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (2000)).
133. SISK, supra note 58, § 7.05, at 435.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000).
135. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (2000).
136. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(d), 1369(b)(3) (2000); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(0 (2000).
137. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (2000).
138. SISK, supra note 58, § 7.05, at 436 (citing the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412 (2000)).
139. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30 (1953) (describing the Federal Tort Claims
Act as "another example" of the trend in legislative waivers of sovereign immunity and
quoting, without acknowledgment, United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940)).
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be subject to judicial review to ensure that those obligations are
legally satisfied and its mistakes are corrected. Through a pattern
of causes of actions created by Congress, the United States government has been made amenable to suit in most areas of substantive
law and covering most situations in which a person would seek
relief.14' Exceptions to liability are designed primarily to protect the
public fisc from excessive claims (such as punitive damages) 141 and
to preclude the courts from evaluating the wisdom rather than the
legality of a policy decision by government officials. 142
In sum, as I have previously described it, congressional enactments "have woven a broad tapestry of authorized judicial actions
'
against the federal government."1 43
Whether those statutory
enactments achieve their liberal purpose, however, depends on
faithful interpretation and application by the courts.

II. ARRESTING THE DRIFT: TOWARD A COHERENT THEORY OF
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY WAIVERS OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
A. The Importance of Sound Rules of Construction:Upholding the
Promise of Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity
The concept of federal sovereign immunity-that the United
States is immune from suit without its permission and is subject to
suit only on such terms and conditions as it may prescribe'44140. See supra Part I.B.1-3.
141. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000) (excluding punitive
damages); see also Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305-12 (1992) (interpreting and
applying punitive damages exclusion of the FTCA).
142. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000) (excepting liability for
discretionary functions); see also In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig. (Robinson v. United
States), 891 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a discretionary function exception must
be read into the Suits in Admiralty Act because "[i]f substantial constitutional issues are not
implicated, the wisdom of decisions made by the executive and legislative branches are not
subject to judicial review"); Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(holding that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA applies "when the question is
not negligence but social wisdom, not due care but political practicability, not reasonableness
but economic expediency").
143. Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels:Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and
Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEo. WASH. L. REV.602, 603 (2003).
144. See supra Part I.A.
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continues to influence the Court's interpretive jurisprudence, even
in the modern era of numerous and broad-sweeping statutory
waivers of that immunity. As the Supreme Court framed the
dilemma of faithful statutory interpretation in Bowen v. City of New
York,'4 5 on the one hand, when Congress places "a condition on the
waiver of sovereign immunity," the statutory limits "must be strictly
construed."'4 6 On the other hand, "in construing the statute [the
Court] must be careful not to 'assume the authority to narrow the
waiver that Congress intended,' or construe the waiver 'unduly
14 7
restrictively.
The disposition and care with which a court approaches a
statutory waiver of federal sovereign immunity is far from academic
or without practical consequence. If a governmental liability statute
is given an unduly expansive reading or extended beyond textual
and contextual justification by judicial implication, governmental
prerogatives necessary to efficient administration of government
activities or programs may be impaired, or policy-making decisions
by the democratic branches of government may be second-guessed
and subjected to chilling interference by the courts. But if a statutory waiver is too narrowly construed in a parsimonious manner,
the affirmative congressional grant of access to justice in the courts
may be frustrated, leaving an individual without a meaningful
remedy for the wrongful acts or omissions of the government.
Because of this tension in guiding principles, the vicissitudes in
the interpretive doctrine for statutory waivers of sovereign immunity are regularly evidenced by anomalies and inconsistencies that
persist in the various lines of Supreme Court precedent. Nonetheless, when the Court's jurisprudence is reviewed longitudinally over
decades and holistically across different types of statutory waivers,
decisions may be found to cluster together in reasoning. Although
exceptions might be cited for many of the propositions that are
presented in the discussion that follows, there remains great value
in sketching out the patterns that appear to be emerging, even if the
shapes are not always perfectly rendered and the lines between one
145. 476 U.S. 467 (1986).
146. Id. at 479.
147. Id. (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118 (1979), and Block v. North
Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983)); see also Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203 (1993)
(same).
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figure and another are not always distinct. Whether the forthcoming
diagram of interpretive methods survives the Supreme Court's
latest foray
into the field is the subject of a later part of this
148
Article.
B. Sovereign Immunity and Jurisdiction:Preserving
JurisdictionalAnalysis in Its Place
Behind every statutory waiver lies the backdrop of sovereign
immunity. Because the United States may not be sued without its
consent, the existence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity
is necessarily a jurisdictional inquiry. 14s Because that consent
defines the authority of the courts to hear a claim against the
government, the identification of the class of claims covered by the
statutory waiver takes on a jurisdictional cast as well. 5 ° Thus, if a
court assumes authority to hear a claim that falls outside the
general scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity, fundamental
jurisdictional limitations on the judiciary may be breached.
Yet if another statutory provision that sets standards for an
allowable claim, limits or excepts liability, or establishes procedural
rules is mistakenly characterized as jurisdictional in nature,
unfortunate deleterious consequences follow close behind.' 5 ' The
determination of which issues deserve to be litigated (or instead
may be waived or forfeited) is taken out of the hands of the parties
(both claimants and the government).' 52 The party that prevails on
the merits may be deprived of victory by a belated jurisdictional
ruling after trial.' The courts are forced to raise and answer new,
sometimes difficult, and often fact-based issues sua sponte.14 As
David Currie lamented about the duty of the courts to "investigat[e]

148. See infra Part III.B-C.
149. See infra Part II.B.1.
150. See infra Part II.B.1.
151. See infra Part II.B.2-3.
152. See Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1 (forthcoming 2008) ('Waiver,
consent, and forfeiture allow the parties to designate which issues require court decision and
which are of such relative unimportance to the parties that they would rather forgo the costs
of litigating them.").
153. See infra Part II.B.2.
154. See infra Part II.B.2.
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the existence of jurisdiction on their own and at any stage of the
proceedings," this is an "expensive habit."15' 5
1. Existence of Legislative Consent for a Class of Claims as a
JurisdictionalPrerequisite
Beginning with a basic premise, if federal sovereign immunity is
to be an enduring doctrine,1 56 an express legislative waiver of
sovereign immunity is necessary to confer any authority to the
157
judiciary to adjudicate claims against the federal government.
In rather formulaic, but nonetheless accurate, words, the Supreme
Court stated in United States v. Mitchell' that "[i]t is axiomatic
that the United States may not be sued without its consent and
that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. 1 59
It naturally follows, then, as the Court also has said, "[a]bsent
that consent, the attempted exercise of judicial power is void." 6 °
Accordingly, as a jurisdictional precondition to adjudication, the
preliminary question of whether sovereign immunity has been
waived must be addressed by the court on its own initiative, even if
not raised by the parties, and may not be waived or forfeited by
government officers or lawyers either by affirmative concession or
by a failure to timely object through a motion to dismiss or in a
responsive pleading.
Further securing a central place for jurisdictional analysis in the
jurisprudence of sovereign immunity, the earliest statutory waivers
were enacted in conjunction with, and indeed were components of,
statutes that expressly granted subject matter jurisdiction to
"' As a general rule, the Supreme Court
particular federal tribunals.16
155. David P. Currie, The FederalCourts and the American Law Institute (PartII), 36 U.
CHI. L. REV. 268, 298 (1969).
156. See supra Part I.A.
157. See United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8Pet.) 436, 444 (1834) ("As the United States
are not suable of common right, the party who institutes such suit must bring his case within
the authority of some act of congress, or the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over it.").
158. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
159. Id. at 212.
160. United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940); see also Lewis v.
Hunt, 492 F.3d 565, 571 (5th Cir. 2007) ("The absence of such a waiver is a jurisdictional
defect.").
161. See Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionalityand Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
2
COLLOQUY 42, 44 (2007), http'J/www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/ 1/
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in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.'62 stated that "[i]f the Legislature clearly
states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as
jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and
will not be left to wrestle with the issue.' 6 3
For example, as discussed earlier, the Tucker Act and its
predecessor statutes integrated the waiver of sovereign immunity
for money claims, notably in contract, with the creation and reaffirmation of the then-Court of Claims as a new federal tribunal
granted jurisdictional authority to hear such claims." Today, trial
court jurisdiction over Tucker Act claims against the United States
is assigned by statute to the Court of Federal Claims,'6 5 with
concurrent jurisdiction over claims for $10,000 or less being granted
to the United States District Courts under what is commonly known
as the "Little" Tucker Act.'6 6 As another example, the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), which waives sovereign immunity for tort
claims against the United States, 16 also grants exclusive jurisdiction over such claims to the United States District Courts. 168 By
virtue of being formulated as part and parcel of new jurisdictional
grants to the federal courts, the basic scope of these statutory
waivers is coextensive with the parameters of federal subject matter
jurisdiction.
Accordingly, whether a cognizable claim has been presented that
falls within the general boundaries of an express statutory waiver
of sovereign immunity and that has been filed in a tribunal with
statutory authority over that class of claims presents a nonwaivable

(stating that the "first guideline" for determining whether a provision is jurisdictional is
"whether the limit was phrased in jurisdictional terms").
162. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).

163. Id. at 515-16 (footnote omitted).
164. See supra Part I.B.1.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000). On the Tucker Act as a jurisdictional statute for the
Court of Federal Claims, see generally SISK, supra note 58, § 4.02(b), at 236-37.
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2000). On the Little Tucker Act as a jurisdictional statute for
the District Courts, see generally SISK, supra note 58, § 4.02(c), at 237-39.
167. See supra Part I.B.2.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000). On jurisdiction and venue for Federal Tort Claims Act
suits, see generally SISK, supra note 58, § 3.04(b), at 119. The Suits in Admiralty Act is
similar, although it speaks in terms of "venue" rather than "jurisdiction," by directing that a
civil action be brought in the United States District Court either where the plaintiff resides
or has its principal place of business or where the vessel or cargo is located. 46 U.S.C.
§ 30,906(a) (2000).
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question of subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts. If the
court lacks authority to adjudicate the claim, any judgment entered
against the United States would be void for lack of jurisdiction by
reason of sovereign immunity.169
Not every statutory provision that relates to a waiver of sovereign
immunity, however, should be regarded as having a jurisdictional
character. 17 As the Supreme Court also stated in Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp., "when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on
coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as
nonjurisdictional in character."'' Other provisions defining the
standards for allowable claims, limitations on liability, exceptions
to the waiver of immunity, or procedural rules may also be established by statute, distinct in text and separate in codified location
from the statutory waiver and any jurisdictional grant. Statutory
provisions, as examples, address the role and compensation of
attorneys, 172 govern discovery and presentation of evidence, 173 or
carve out exceptions to the liability that otherwise is afforded under
the statute. 74 And, as with other federal causes of action, statutory
waivers of sovereign immunity are typically covered by a statute of
169. See United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 513-15 (1940) (holding that
the United States was not bound by a prior judgment on a claim in a court as to which the
government had not waived sovereign immunity). For discussions of United States Fidelity
& Guaranty as a possible sovereign immunity exception to res judicata and recent
controversies in the lower federal courts about the reach of that exception, see generally SISK,
supranote 58, § 6.08, at 413-18; Florey, supra note 44.
170. For further discussion of the modern trend in removing prescription of standards,
limitations, exceptions, and procedural rules from the jurisdictional inquiry, see infra Part
II.B.3.
171. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006); see also Howard Wasserman,

Jurisdiction,Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on Dodson's Trichotomy, 102 Nw. U. L. REV
COLLOQUY 215,216 (2008), http://law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/ 2008/6/ (arguing
"that courts should consider a provision of positive law as jurisdictional only when its plain
language is addressed to the court and speaks in terms of judicial power about the class of
cases that courts can hear and resolve").
172. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (2000) (authorizing a party to be represented by an
attorney before the Court of Federal Claims); id. § 2678 (prohibiting an attorney from
charging more than 25 percent of the judgment to a client seeking recovery under the Federal
Tort Claims Act).
173. See, e.g., id. § 2503(a) (authorizing production of evidence and examination of
witnesses in the Court of Federal Claims); id. § 2507 (allowing discovery of the government
by the Court of Federal Claims).
174. See, e.g., id. § 2680 (establishing a number of exceptions to liability under the Federal
Tort Claims Act).
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limitations, which ordinarily is not embedded within the particular
statutory section that articulates the waiver and speaks in the
language of jurisdiction.'7 5
Moreover, most recent statutory waivers have been enacted
separate from any jurisdictional grant. For example, the waiver of
sovereign immunity found in the APA 76 for claims seeking specific
relief against the federal government does not provide an independent grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts.'
Instead, the
authority of the United States District Courts to review federal
agency action under the APA is found in the general federalquestion jurisdictional statute.7 8 As another example, the freestanding general waiver of sovereign immunity for awards of
attorney's fees against the United States found in the Equal Access
to Justice Act (EAJA)179 is not only separate from any specific
jurisdictional grant but also is unattached to any particular cause
of action. The EAJA provides that fees may be awarded in civil
actions against the United States "in any court having jurisdiction
of that action" (that is, the underlying cause of action against the
federal government). 8 ° Thus, this statute may operate, inter alia,
in the United States District Courts, the United States Courts of
Appeals, the Court of Federal Claims, the United States Court of
International Trade, and the Court of Veterans Appeals.'
Although the core jurisdictional requirement of an express waiver
for the class of claims remains, the nonjurisdictional textual
character of these more recent statutes accomplishing the waiver
175. See, e.g., id. § 2401(b) (establishing a two-year statute of limitations for the Federal
Tort Claims Act in a separate section and code chapter from the waiver and grant of
jurisdiction); id. § 2501 (establishing a six-year statute of limitations for claims in the Court
of Federal Claims, in a separate section and code chapter from the waiver and grant of
jurisdiction). For more on statutes of limitations as nonjurisdictional, see infra Part II.B.3.
176. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) (allowing claims under the Administrative Procedure Act against
the United States).
177. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 106-07 (1977).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). On jurisdiction over and judicial review under the APA, see
generally SISK, supra note 58, § 4.10(c), at 335-36.
179. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000). On the EAJA, see generally SISK, supra note 58, § 7.11, at
474-501.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
181. On the scope of the EAJA in federal tribunals, see generally Gregory C. Sisk, The
Essentialsof the EqualAccess to JusticeAct: Court Awards of Attorney's Fees for Unreasonable
Government Conduct (PartOne), 55 LA. L. REV. 217, 229-46 (1994).
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confirms that the specific elements for defining and presenting these
claims against the sovereign, or defending against them by the
government, are not jurisdictional mandates requiring sua sponte
judicial attention.
2. Early Decisions that Overextended JurisdictionalAnalysis
When the earliest statutory waivers of sovereign immunity came
before the judiciary for consideration, the Supreme Court extended
jurisdictional assumptions well beyond the core questions of the
existence and basic scope of the waiver. Most prominently, at a very
early stage in the jurisprudence, a series of early Supreme Court
decisions suggested, in what was largely ill-considered dicta, that
the predecessor statute of limitations'8 2 for cases in the then-Court
of Claims had jurisdictional force. 8' Not only was the jurisdictional
edifice for this nonsubstantive element grounded on unnecessary
dicta, but the Court failed to carefully analyze the text of the
statute, ignored the legislative history, and neglected the ubiquitous
legal understanding of the period that a statute of limitations was
a waivable affirmative defense."
Because the early statutory waivers for money claims before the
then-Court of Claims were intertwined with a grant of jurisdiction
to a new tribunal,'8 5 it is understandable, if unfortunate, that a
dense thicket of jurisdictionally embedded rules grew up around
these statutes. The aggressive importation ofjurisdictional concepts
beyond substantive provisions and into an ordinary statute of

182. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 10, 12 Stat. 767 (codified as revised at 28 U.S.C. § 2501

(2000)).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Wardwell, 172 U.S. 48, 50, 52 (1898) (declaring that the
statute of limitations for the Court of Claims was "not merely a statute of limitations but also
jurisdictional in its nature," although the jurisdictional question was not presented because
the government openly challenged the timeliness of the action in the courts); Kendall v.
United States, 107 U.S. 123, 124-25 (1883) (describing the claims as to which judgment could
not be entered against the United States as including those "declared barred if not asserted
within the time limited by the statute," although the case did not present the question of
whether the statute of limitations was a non-waivable jurisdictional matter because "[tihe
government demurred" in the case on limitations grounds).
184. For a detailed discussion of the text, legislative history, and contemporary legal
understanding of what today is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2501, see infra Part III.A.
185. See supra Part I.B.1.
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limitations,"'6 however, is difficult to ascribe to anything other than
judicial discomfort with the then-novel concept of a broad statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity. These early holdings are perhaps
best understood as the Supreme Court's hesitant and skeptical
introduction to what was then a new category of legislation that
afforded general judicial remedies against the government for
monetary claims based on governmental wrongs.
From these early'8 7 inelegant judicial encounters with waiving
legislation emerged the troublesome recitation that any "term" or
"condition" on the waiver of sovereign immunity is elevated to
jurisdictional status. 8 If this condition-equals-jurisdiction recipe
simply identifies the core requirement of an express statutory
waiver for the general class or category of claim, the formula is
unremarkable (if largely unhelpful, because calling something a
"term" or a "condition" on the government's waiver of immunity
appears to be more a conclusory label than a meaningful guide to
analysis). If, however, the reference to a jurisdictional condition or
term was read to encompass every matter pertinent to a statutory
waiver-meaning that every provision that could limit, constrain,
except, or regulate the process for adjudicating governmental
liability constitutes a prerequisite to exercise of judicial author-

186. See Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 145 (2002) (finding 28 U.S.C.

§ 2501 to be an "unexceptional" statute of limitations, comparable in text to "[a] number of
contemporaneous [nineteenth century] state statutes of limitations applicable to suits
between private parties").
187. The earliest use of the term "condition" as a jurisdictional mandate appears to have
been made in Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 232-33 (1887), which said that, whether
pleaded by the government or not, the court has a duty to dismiss an untimely suit in the
Court of Claims because:
[T]he statute [of limitations], in our opinion, makes it a condition or qualification
of the right to a judgment against the United States that ... the claim must be
put in suit by the voluntary action of the claimant ... within six years after suit
could be commenced thereon against the Government.
188. See Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287-89 (1983) (stating "that when Congress
attaches conditions to legislation waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States, those
conditions must be strictly observed," and suggesting that failure to observe such a condition
would result in a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399
(1976) ("Mhe United States, as sovereign, 'is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued
... and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to
entertain the suit."' (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941))).
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ity-then every jot and tittle in each statutory waiver would be
transformed into a jurisdictional command.189
The consequences of an all-consuming jurisdictional imperative
for statutory waivers of sovereign immunity would include, but
extend beyond, the denial of justice to individual claimants who
could not rely upon decisions by government litigators to waive or
concede statutory and other defenses and who were repeatedly
forced to anticipate and litigate new and unanticipated statutory
disputes.19 ° In addition, under a comprehensive jurisdictional
regime, federal judges would have a sua sponte duty to ascertain the
satisfaction of each statutory element, regardless of whether the
government raises or even deliberately waives the matter. The
federal courts would be obliged to identify and thoroughly explore
each item on an exhaustive (and exhausting) list of every statutory
element, limitation, exception, procedural requirement, time
limitation, etc., that conceivably could be invoked as a defense to the
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.
3. Reserving JurisdictionalInquiry for Core Matters, While
Removing Other Standards,Limitations, Exceptions, and
ProceduralRules from JurisdictionalAnalysis
Fortunately, although nineteenth century decisions mistakenly
fell back upon the familiar but misplaced concept of subject matter
jurisdiction as part of a primitive approach to a new statutory
category, the Supreme Court since has developed a more mature
and better tailored approach toward the increasingly commonplace
judicial encounter with a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.
Today, the Court continues to demand an express and unambiguous
congressional statement of governmental consent to suit for a class
or category of claims. But the jurisdictional inquiry focuses on the
initial grant, often expressed in the language of jurisdiction, and
189. But see Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 665-66 (1996) (rejecting the
government's argument that the section in the Suits in Admiralty Act that waives immunity
for admiralty claims and includes court venue provisions, should be read, "in its entirety," as
"spelling out the terms and conditions of the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity" and
thus should be regarded as "jurisdictional" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
190. For further discussion of the unhealthy nature of overextended jurisdictionalism, see
infra Part III.C.
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does not absorb every standard, limitation, exception, or procedural
rule.
As the Supreme Court explained in Feres v. United States,'9 1 one
of its first decisions interpreting the FTCA, the statute "confers
jurisdiction to render judgment upon all such claims," over civil
actions for money damages against the United States, "[b]ut it does
not say that all claims must be allowed."' 92 "Jurisdiction of the
defendant now exists where the defendant was immune from suit
before"; the Court added, "it remains for courts, in exercise of their
jurisdiction, to determine whether any claim is recognizable in
law."' 9 3 Thus, statutory provisions that "prescribe the test of
allowable claims" and "exceptions" to liability fall within the court's
jurisdiction to grant or deny a claim on its merits but are not
jurisdictional rules in and of themselves.9
As an important illustration of the increasing reservation of
jurisdictional scrutiny to core and general matters,'9 5 for nearly two
decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly turned aside the
government's insistence that time limitations should be treated as
jurisdictional conditions on the waiver of sovereign immunity. In
Bowen v. City of New York,' 96 the Court rejected the government's
argument that the statute of limitations for disability benefit claims
under the Social Security Act'9 7 is "jurisdictional," instead characterizing the provision as "a period of limitations" that may be equitably
tolled. 9 ' In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,'99 the Court
reversed the lower court's ruling that the statutory filing deadline
for Title VII employment discrimination claims against the federal
government ° "operates as an absolute jurisdictional limit."' '01
191. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
192. Id. at 140-41.
193. Id. at 141.
194. See id.at 140-41.
195. For further discussion of interpretation of procedural limitations, including statutes
of limitations, on statutory waivers of sovereign immunity, see infra Part II.D.
196. 476 U.S. 467 (1986).
197. On the Social Security Act as a waiver of sovereign immunity for benefit claims, see
supra Part I.B.3.
198. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 478-79.
199. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
200. On Title VII as a waiver of federal sovereign immunity for employment discrimination
claims against the federal government, see supra Part I.B.3.
201. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 91-92.
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Indeed, even the labeling of such a statutory element as a
"condition" on a statutory waiver no longer moves the Court to
invoke jurisdictional absolutes. In Irwin, the Court acknowledged
that the limitations period for Title VII suits against the government was "a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity," but the
Court nonetheless chose to "mak[e] the rule of equitable tolling
applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it
is applicable to private suits."2 °2
Because the Supreme Court "has no authority to create equitable
exceptions to jurisdictional requirements,"" 3 the Court's presumptive allowance of equitable tolling of statutes of limitations on
claims against the government removes such provisions from the
category of jurisdictional commands. The sine qua non of a jurisdictional rule is a demand for strict and nonwaivable compliance
with its terms. By instead adopting a general rule of equitable
tolling in civil cases against the government in Irwin, the nonjurisdictional nature of these statutes of limitations was emphatically
confirmed." 4 In sum, under the Court's sovereign immunity
jurisprudence over the past quarter-century, a jurisdictional
construction has been maintained for evaluation of the essential
character of claims for relief that are permitted against the federal
government, but procedural requirements generally have been
applied in the same manner as among private parties. °5
The Court's current understanding of the central, but not allconsuming, place for jurisdictional analysis in construction of

202. Id. at 94-95.
203. Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007); see also Scott Dodson, In Search of
Removal Jurisdiction,102 Nw. U. L. REV. 55,60 (2008) ("Defects in subject matter jurisdiction
cannot be forfeited, waived, or consented to; they are not subject to principles of estoppel; and
they can be raised at any time and by any party, including a court sua sponte.").
204. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 94-96; see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385,
393 (1982) (noting that "filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of
limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling"); Wood-Ivey Sys. Corp. v.
United States, 4 F.3d 961, 969 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Plager, J., concurring) ("Since Irwin,
compliance with statutory time limits is no longer jurisdictional, in the old sense that when
a Congressionally specified time limit had expired a court had no power to entertain the
case.").
205. Cf. Dodson, supra note 203, at 59 (generally distinguishing jurisdiction from
procedure, saying that "[p]rocedure is the regulation of that power or authority [ofjurisdiction
over a matter] once obtained").
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statutory waivers of sovereign immunity is well illustrated by the
jurisdictional line adopted in construction of the various elements
of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).2 °6
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Meyer,2 °7 the Supreme
Court considered whether the FTCA superseded a statute that
generally permits a particular agency to "sue and be sued" and
thereby precluded a direct claim for money damages against the
agency for a constitutional violation.2 ° s By express directive, the
FTCA is the exclusive venue for suits against agencies that are
authorized to "sue and be sued" in their own name if the claim is
"cognizable" under the FTCA.2 °9 Defining "cognizable" as meaning
that a claim is within the adjudicative authority of a court, the
Court ruled that the "inquiry focuses on the jurisdictional grant
provided by § 1346(b)."2 1 Examining this statute, which speaks in
the language of jurisdiction, the Court explained:
Section 1346(b) grants the federal district courts jurisdiction
over a certain category of claims for which the United States has
waived its sovereign immunity and "render[ed]" itself liable.
This category includes claims that are:
"[1] against the United States, [2] for money damages,
...
[3] for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
death [4] caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government [5] while
acting within the scope of his office or employment, [6]
under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b).
A claim comes within this jurisdictional grant-and thus is
"cognizable" under § 1346(b)-if it is actionable under § 1346(b).
And a claim is actionable under § 1346(b) if it alleges the six
elements outlined above.2"1'
206. On the FTCA as a waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims against the federal
government, see supra Part I.B.2.

207. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
208. See id. at 475-86 (internal quotation omitted).

209. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a) (2000).
210. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 476 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
211. Id. at 477 (citations omitted); see also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140-41
(1950) (describing § 1346(b) as conferring jurisdiction, while regarding § 2674 and other
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Because constitutional tort claims, such as those raised in Meyer, do
not fall within the jurisdictional scope of the FTCA,212 that statute
is not the exclusive remedy in such cases.2 1
Looking then at the FTCA as a statutory waiver, under the light
shed by the Meyer decision, the jurisdictional part of the interpretive analysis focuses upon § 1346(b), which the Court had previously
characterized as the "principal provision" of the FTCA.214 Section
1346(b) outlines the basic scope of the waiver and the jurisdictional
compass of court authority over tort claims against the United
States, setting forth the six requisite elements. Thus, for example,
whether a government employee was "acting within the scope of his
* employment," and whether the "circumstances" are such that a
"private person" would be liable, are jurisdictional questions that
must be satisfactorily answered before the court has the authority
to adjudicate the claim.2 15
Section 2674 of the FTCA2 16 further defines the elements of the
waiver, but in a nonjurisdictional section.1 7 Section 2674 more
specifically describes the standard of liability and adds the exclusion of governmental liability for "interest prior to judgment" and
"for punitive damages."2 '8 When the Supreme Court construed this
provisions in the FTCA as prescribing what claims are allowable, to be determined by courts
in exercising that jurisdiction).
212. On constitutional torts as falling outside of the FTCA, see generally SISK, supra note
58, § 3.05(b)(2), at 127-29, § 3.06(d)(1), at 156-58.
213. Although the agency's sue-and-be-sued clause thus was not superseded in Meyer, the
Court ultimately refused to recognize a valid cause of action against a federal government
entity for money damages for an alleged constitutional violation. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 483-86.
214. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962).
215. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
216. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000) ("The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions
of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or
for punitive damages.").
217. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 484-85 (2006) (describing the FTCA as
waiving sovereign immunity "in two different sections," the first (§ 1346(b)(1)) which "confers
federal-court jurisdiction in a defined category of cases involving negligence committed by
federal employees in the course of their employment," and the second (§ 2674) which further
outlines the elements of "claims falling within this jurisdictional grant"); see also Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950) (describing § 2674 as "go[ing] on to prescribe the test
of allowable claims," which involve the court's adjudication on the merits as a matter of law
"in exercise of their jurisdiction" which had been granted by § 1346(b)).
218. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
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prohibition on awards of punitive damages in Molzof v. United
States,2 19 the Court rejected the government's suggestion of a special
definition that would limit governmental liability to strictly
compensatory damages, instead adopting the traditional commonlaw understanding of punitive damages as that which is designed
to punish a party for egregious misconduct.2 2 ° The "cardinal rule" of
statutory construction, by which a term of art borrowed by Congress
is to be given its traditional meaning, was declared by the Molzof
' The
Court to "carr[y] particular force in interpreting the FTCA."2 21
Court also noted the practical difficulties in applying the government's demand that any excessive damage award be treated as
somehow punitive in effect.222 In thereby relying on ordinary
principles of statutory construction and giving considerable weight
to the practical consequences, the Court declined to defer to the
"Government's restrictive reading of the statute,"2 23 much less apply
a rigid jurisdictional analysis. Indeed, after quoting the punitive
damages limitation as found in § 2674, the Court referred to the
"jurisdictional grant over FTCA cases" as being separately found in
§ 1346(b). 2 24
Even more so, then, the numerous exceptions to liability under
the FTCA-from the discretionary function exception through the
transmission of mail exception and to the military combat
exception 2 2 5-presumably should not be treated as jurisdictional
provisions. 226 As elsewhere in this field of law, the Supreme Court's
219. 502 U.S. 301 (1992).
220. Id. at 304-12.
221. Id. at 307.
222. Id. at 309-10.
223. Id. at 310.
224. Id. at 305.
225. On the exceptions to the FTCA, see supra Part I.B.2.
226. In appropriate cases, some exceptions to the FTCA may have jurisdictional
implications by way of justiciability limitations on the federal judiciary. For example, through
the discretionary function exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000), "Congress wished to prevent
judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social,
economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort." United States v. S.A.
Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813-14 (1984). In
sum, the discretionary function exception is grounded in "separation of powers concerns."
Mark C. Niles, "Nothing But Mischief" The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of
DiscretionaryImmunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1323 (2002). Accordingly, as I have written
previously, "the discretionary function exception appears to be a species of the 'political
question' doctrine, under which the courts will refuse to hear complaints when the challenged
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statements have not always been consistent, although suggestions
that the FTCA exceptions have jurisdictional force have arisen only
as dicta. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has spoken of the
grant of jurisdiction in the FTCA as not extending to the matters
covered by the exceptions,2 27 and has described an exception as
' although
"preclud[ing] the exercise of jurisdiction,"2 28
such jurisdictional questions as whether exceptions were subject to waiver or
forfeiture were not presented in these cases. By contrast, in both
Indian Towing Co. v. United States22 9 and Block v. Neal,2 30 the Court
noted that the government had conceded that the discretionary
function exception was not implicated, a concession the Court did
not question as it would have been obliged to do sua sponte were it
a jurisdictional element. Importantly, in the decade since the Court
clarified the jurisdictional reach of the FTCA in Meyer, no decision
has ascribed jurisdictional significance to an exception.2 3' In its
governmental decision is regarded as being constitutionally committed to the political
branches of government or beyond the expertise of the courts to resolve." SISK, supra note 58,
§ 3.06(b)(3), at 145. Indeed, for reasons of constitutional separation of powers, every court of
appeals to address the question has held that a discretionary function exception must be
implicit in the Suits in Admiralty Act, even though it is not expressly included in that
statutory waiver. See, e.g., McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 338-49 (4th Cir. 2004)
(en banc); In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig. (Robinson v. United States), 891 F.2d 31,
35 (2d Cir. 1989); Gordon v. Lykes Bros. S.S., 835 F.2d 96, 98-100 (5th Cir. 1988); Canadian
Transp. Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085-87 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See generally SISK,
supranote 58, § 3.11, at 192-94 (collecting and discussing cases). Similar justiciability issues
may arise in particular cases with respect to the military combat exception, 28 U.S.C. §
2680(j) (2000), and the foreign country exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000). But, in general
and as a matter of theory (not being part of the core waiver) and location within the code
(codified separately from the jurisdictional grant), the exceptions to the FTCA should be
treated as separate from the jurisdictional inquiry.
227. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 398 (1988).
228. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 199 (1993).
229. 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955).
230. 460 U.S. 289, 294 (1983).
231. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 710 (2004), the Court did say that foreign
substantive law might apply in FTCA cases "if federal courts follow headquarters doctrine to
assume jurisdiction over tort claims against the Government for foreign harm" that had been
planned or supervised inside the borders of the United States, which was another reason to
read the foreign country exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000), as barring claims involving
injury in another nation. In this part of the opinion, however, the Court was speaking of
"jurisdiction" primarily in terms of the geographic location of the court, whether in one or
another state or country, with choice of law consequences, rather than in terms of federal
judicial authority to hear a particular class of claims. In any event, the Court did not directly
rule or suggest that the FTCA exception was a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite. See
id. at 710-12.
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recent decision in Dolan v. United States PostalService,2 32 which is
discussed in more detail below,2 33 the Court explained that it was
inclined to construe exceptions to the waiver more narrowly, so as
not to defeat the sweeping purpose of the FTCA in waiving sovereign immunity.2 u
For the same reason, the statute of limitations governing FTCA
claims,"' which isnot included within the general section waiving
sovereign immunity and simultaneously conferring district court
jurisdiction,2" 6 presumably would not be given a jurisdictional read
and would not constitute a nonwaivable constraint on judicial
authority. Although the Supreme Court in the past has described
this statute of limitations as a "condition of [the] waiver" of
sovereign immunity,2 3 7 the Court has never expressly characterized
it as jurisdictional nor addressed the question of whether it is
subject to equitable tolling. Reasoning that the FTCA contains "a
garden variety limitations provision,"23' 8 every court of appeals to
address the question has concluded or suggested that the FTCA
provision is not jurisdictional and instead falls within the presumption of Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs2 3 9 -that statutes of
limitations in federal government cases are subject to equitable
tolling.24 °
232. 546 U.S. 481 (2006).
233. See infra Part II.C.3.
234. Dolan, 546 U.S. at 491-92; see also United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34
(1992) (saying that the Court has "narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of sovereign
immunity where that was consistent with Congress' clear intent, as in the context of the
sweeping language' of the Federal Tort Claims Act") (citation omitted).
235. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000).
236. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
237. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979).
238. Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1999).
239. 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990). For more on the Irwin presumption in favor of equitable
tolling of statutes of limitations in federal government cases, see infra Parts II.D and III.A.
240. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281, 288-91 (1st Cir. 2002); Hughes v.
United States, 263 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2001); Perez, 167 F.3d at 917-19; Alvarez-Machain
v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1997); Glarner v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Admin.,
30 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1994); Pipkin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 274-75 (10th Cir.
1991); see also Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that strict
compliance with FTCA statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional prerequisite). But see
Wukawitz v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (D. Utah 2001) (holding that Congress
did not intend to permit equitable tolling of the FTCA statute of limitations); Ugo Colella &
Adam Bain, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Putting the
Legislative History in ProperPerspective, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 174 (2000) (arguing that the
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In sum, the initial jurisdictional hold on the jurisprudence of
statutory waivers of sovereign immunity has loosened significantly
since the early and inhospitable judicial reception to such statutes
in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. Over the past twenty years,
the Supreme Court appears to have developed a more refined
approach in which the jurisdictional inquiry is reserved for the core
and general waiver of the statute for a class of claims, which
provisions also frequently speak expressly in terms of conferring
jurisdiction upon a particular tribunal.
But then, in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,24 1 the
Court departed from its recent course and resurrected the
precedential force of a line of decisions from that earlier era that
had extended absolute and nonwaivable status to the statute of
limitations governing a particular category of statutory waivers. Is
the jurisdictional grip on statutory waivers tightening again? The
potential significance of this deviation from recent trends in the
Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence is addressed in a later
part of this Article.242
C. Constructionof a Waiver's Substantive Scope: Strict in Theory,
24 3
Calibratedand Pragmaticin Practice
Nearly sixty years ago, the Supreme Court observed that '[t]he
exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough
where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by

legislative history of the FTCA indicates Congress did not intend the statute of limitations
to be subject to equitable exceptions); Richard Parker & Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable
Tolling and the Federal Tort Claims Act: The Impact of Brockamp and Beggerly, 29 SETON
HALL L. REV. 885, 890 (1999) (same).
241. 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008).
242. See infra Part III.
243. Gerald Gunther once described the Supreme Court's approach of strict scrutiny as
applied to certain statutory provisions that made distinctions based on race as 'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). By my riff on that theme, I argue that the Court's "strict" construction of statutory waivers of sovereign immunity is not invariably fatal to claims against
the government, but pragmatic in application, calibrated to the type of provision at issue, and
not eliding careful attention to text, context, and legislative purpose.
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refinement of construction where consent has been announced."'2 44
As Justice Scalia has said with respect to general principles of legal
interpretation, "[a] text should not be construed strictly, and it
should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably,
to contain all that it fairly means."24' 5 Unfortunately, over the
decades, the Court often has recited "the traditional principle that
the Government's consent to be sued 'must be construed strictly in
favor of the sovereign,"'246 but without explaining what strict
construction means and without placing this rubric in qualifying
context within a coherent framework for interpretation of statutory
waivers of sovereign immunity.
As recently as two years ago, while acknowledging tension in the
case law in this field of law, I wrote that the "strict construction
approach appears to predominate."2 4' 7 In fact, on further review, the
domination of this parsimonious judicial attitude toward statutory
waivers of sovereign immunity appears to be fading somewhat. But
the principal questions are not so much whether a form of strict
construction persists, as when such a method is appropriately
invoked and what it entails in application. Formulaic references to
"strict construction" are unlikely to advance understanding and
uphold the legislative intent. Instead, we must examine the
rationale for, and meaning of, this interpretive canon, calibrate this
method of construction to the character and animating purpose of
the statutory provision at issue, and insist upon close attention to
text, context, and history. When the canon of strict construction is
properly employed, it should be an aid to analysis and not merely a
make-weight to justify a ruling in favor of the government that has
already been reached for other, perhaps unstated, reasons.

244. United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383 (1949) (quoting Anderson
v. Hayes Constr. Co., 153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (N.Y. 1926)).
245. SCALIA, supra note 4, at 23. For Justice Scalia's views on a clear statement rule for
waivers of federal sovereign immunity, see infra note 268.
246. United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992) (quoting McMahon v. United
States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Philip P. Frickey,
Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation:A Lecture in Honor of Irving
Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199, 206 (1999) (critically referring to the rule that "statutes
waiving sovereign immunity are narrowly construed," as an example of those canons or "rules
of thumb" that are "based on judicially identified policies").
247. SISK, supra note 58, § 2.03, at 97.
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It is far too late in the day to contend that the United States is an
ordinary party. As the representative of the collective polity, the
federal government must be empowered to act, within its constitutional and statutory authority, in a manner that is not subject to
second-guessing by the courts in the guise of a civil suit for damages
or an equitable action for specific relief. In this sense, as the
Supreme Court said more than a century ago, "in its dealings with
individuals, public policy demands that the government should
' But it is one thing to favor
occupy an apparently favored position."2 48
the government in cases of genuine interpretive doubt when one of
the choices would expose the government to a new cause of action or
subject the federal government to a previously unrecognized form
of relief.2 49 It is quite another thing to allow the canon of strict
construction to devolve into a methodology by which the government
wins automatically whenever plausible arguments can be made for
alternative interpretations of a statutory provision that sets forth
standards, limitations, exceptions, or procedural rules for claims
against the government already authorized by an express waiver.
1. Strong PresumptionAgainst Interpretinga Waiver To Allow
a New Cause of Action or Remedy
Given the longstanding rule that permission for suit against the
United States must be unequivocally and unambiguously expressed,
the Supreme Court understandably has shown solicitude for unique
governmental interests when determining whether the people's
representatives have consented to suit at all and in sketching the
material breadth of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.
Asking when civil litigation is an appropriate response to harms
caused by governmental activities, which claims are suited for the
judicial venue rather than being redressed by legislation or
administrative procedures, what types and theories of liability that
should be recognized in suits alleging governmental wrongs, and
248. United States v. Verdier, 164 U.S. 213, 219 (1896).
249. See Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 128 S. Ct. 2007, 2019 (2008) (observing that the
Court had "resort[ed] to the canon" of strict construction in Departmentof Energy v.Ohio, 503
U.S. 607, 626-27 (1992), "only after a close reading of the statutory provision had left the
Court 'with an unanswered question and an unresolved tension between closely related
statutory provisions' (citing Dep't of Energy, 503 U.S. at 626)).
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which forms of relief that may be imposed against the government
as an entity, are all questions that go to the very core of the concept
of sovereign immunity and its grounding in constitutional separation of powers.25 °
Articulated as a "strong presumption against the waiver of
sovereign immunity,"2 5 ' the principle of strict construction applies
most readily to these core questions of whether the government is
amenable to suit based upon a particular theory of liability and
whether the government should be subject to the remedy requested.
Accordingly, the presumption that a statutory waiver is narrow in
scope is at its strongest when the matter at issue is the theory of
liability (the cause-of-action) or the availability of a particular
remedy (money, interest, specific performance, declaratory judgment, injunction, etc.). As the Supreme Court stated in Lane v.
Pena,252 "a waiver of the Government's sovereign immunity will be
strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign."25
In Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond,2 54 the Court
cited the rule that "authorizations for suits against the Government
must be construed strictly in its favor," as justifying the Court's
refusal to allow equitable estoppel to excuse the explicit terms of a
statute when a government employee's misstatement caused a
person claiming government benefits to fail to satisfy statutory
eligibility requirements.25 5 Similarly, in United States v. Nordic
Village, Inc. 256he Court invoked the "traditional principle" that the
government's consent to suit must be strictly construed in the
course of finding that there was no unequivocal textual provision
that unambiguously waived the government's immunity from
monetary relief sought by a bankruptcy trustee in an adversary

250. On the concept of federal sovereign immunity, see supra Part I.A.
251. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 162 n.9 (1981); see also E. Transp. Co. v.
United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 (1927) (saying that "[t]he sovereignty of the United States
raises a presumption against its suability, unless it is clearly shown").
252. 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
253. Id. at 192 (emphasis added); see also Dep't of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261
(1999) (saying that "a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its
scope, in favor of the sovereign").
254. 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
255. Id. at 432.
256. 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
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proceeding in a bankruptcy court." 7 In Orff v. United States,2 5 the
Court held that an attempt by purported third-party beneficiaries
to enforce a contract against the United States, absent express
statutory permission for such a noncontracting plaintiff to sue the
United States alone, "founders on the principle that a waiver of
sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the
sovereign."25' 9 In each of these cases, the rule of strict construction
was applied to preclude judicial implication of what essentially
would have been new causes of action against the United States,
with direct or indirect fiscal consequences.
Several examples may also be adduced of the Court's strong
aversion to allowing a new remedy against the government without
explicit legislative leave, even if general consent has been granted
for the general category of claim. The Court cited the rule of strict
construction in Library of Congress v. Shaw26 ° when refusing to
allow an award of prejudgment interest on an award of attorney's
fees against the United States under the Title VII waiver of
sovereign immunity, 261 absent an express provision in the statutory
text for allowing interest as "an element of damages separate from
damages on the substantive claim. 2 62 Similarly, in Department of
the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.,263 the Court employed the rubric of strict
construction in rejecting the suggestion that a party seeking funds
allegedly owed to them could obtain a lien on those funds held by
the United States through the general provision for specific relief
under the Administrative Procedure Act. 2" As yet another example,
"one of the most venerable and enduring rules of government
contract law specifically, and indeed of sovereign immunity doctrine
in general, has been that the remedy of specific performance is not
available to compel the government to accept or discharge the duties
257. Id. at 33-37.
258. 545 U.S. 596 (2005).
259. Id. at 601-02.
260. 478 U.S. 310 (1986).
261. Id. at 318.
262. Id. at 314; see also United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1993) (explaining that "[iln
several of our cases exemplifying the rule of strict construction of a waiver of sovereign
immunity, we rejected efforts to assess monetary liability against the United States for what
are normal incidents of litigation between private parties," and citing cases precluding awards
of court costs, interest, and punitive fines absent express congressional consent).
263. 525 U.S. 255 (1999).
264. Id. at 260-61.
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agreed to under a contract., 26 5 Thus, from the nineteenth century
forward, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Tucker Act to
authorize an award of monetary damages for breach of contract,2 66
while rejecting the remedy of specific performance as likely to
interfere unduly with the exercise
of governmental discretion by the
2 67
other branches of government.
In all of these cases, the rule of strict construction applies not as
a prescription for resolving all questions in favor of the government,
but as an emphatic pronouncement that new causes of action and
remedies against the government will not be created by judicial
implication. Indeed, in these cases-where the matter at issue was
recognition of a new theory of liability or a new form of relief against
the sovereign-the Court has established what scholarly commentators term a "clear statement rule," that is, a demand for a plain and
unequivocal expression by Congress in the text of a statute concerning the core elements of any waiver of federal sovereign
immunity.26 John Nagle explains that the Supreme Court requires
265. SISK, supra note 58, § 4.08(b)(4), at 308.
266. See United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1969).
267. See, e.g., In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 503-06 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52,
71 (1886); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 727-28 (1883). See generallySeamon, supra note
59, at 199 ("The [restriction on specific performance] prevents judicial interference with the
discretion of officials in the political branches. In particular, the rule gives officials flexibility
to get out of contracts that, they determine, no longer serve the public interest.").
268. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 595 n.4, 643 (1992);
Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court's New Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and the
McCarranAmendment: Toward EndingState Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, 18 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 433, 460-61 (1994); John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an
Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 771, 773-76, 796-98, 806 (1995). William
Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett characterize the adoption of a clear statement
rule for determining whether there is a waiver of federal sovereign immunity as a "great
expansion in the power of the canon" of strict construction, which the Supreme Court has
failed to justify. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRIcKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETr,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 338 (2000). Although acknowledging that
"rules of construction that load the dice for or against a particular result" are difficult for the
"honest textualist" to justify, Justice Scalia argues that "congressional elimination of state
sovereign immunity is such an extraordinary act, one would normally expect it to be explicitly
decreed rather than offhandedly implied-so something like a 'clear statement' rule is merely
normal interpretation." SCALIA, supra note 4, at 27-29. He then adds: "[a]nd the same,
perhaps, with waiver of sovereign immunity." Id. at 29. Note that the matter for which a clear
congressional statement is expected is the existence of an express waiver of federal sovereign
immunity-not for every element of liability or procedure that accompanies such a waiver.
William Eskridge criticizes Justice Scalia's justification for a clear statement rule on
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"specifically targeted statutory language and refuse[s] to consider
other indicia of legislative intent" in the construction of a grant of
judicial relief against the federal government.26 9 When the cause of
action is not expressly recognized in the statute and the government
has not explicitly indicated its willingness to assume a form of
liability through legislative consent, the strong presumption against
an inexplicit waiver of immunity leads ineluctably to a ruling in
favor of the government.
The traditional rule of strict construction is most secure when
employed to narrowly define the general subject of a claim and the
type of relief afforded by the waiver. But this unyielding approach
becomes less stable and not easily justified when invoked to demand
an obdurate reading in favor of the government with respect to
every standard, limitation, exception, or procedural rule that
accompanies or is pertinent to a statutory waiver.
2. Strictness of ConstructionLessens with GreaterJudicial
Familiaritywith a Statutory Waiver: The Evolution of the Tucker
Act in the Supreme Court
As one federal court stated many decades ago, the rule of strict

construction should not become "a judicial vise to squeeze the
natural and obvious import out of... a statute or to sap its language
of its normal and sound legal meaning. '270 Moreover, the text should

be read in context within a statutory code and with a pragmatic
understanding of the legal environment in which the statute was
abridgment of sovereign immunity, noting among other reasons that "such legislation is no
longer extraordinary." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 1509, 1544 n.127 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MASTER OF INTERPRETATION
(1997)). While Eskridge was speaking of legislation eliminating state sovereign immunity,
statutes waiving federal sovereign immunity are even more ubiquitous today. See supra Part
I.B.
269. Nagle, supra note 268, at 773. Nagle criticizes the requirement of a "clear statement,"
complaining that "while it is easy for Congress to write a provision that waives sovereign
immunity generally, it is hard for Congress to write a provision that specifies the scope of a
waiver of sovereign immunity." Id. at 776. Similarly, in an era of greater acceptance of the
government's amenability to suit and of judicial independence, Vicki Jackson argues that the
"abstract idea of sovereign immunity" should not be invoked to deny "remedies to address
violations of legal rights" in cases in which "there is room for interpretation on questions of
jurisdiction and remedies." Jackson, supra note 51, at 607-09.
270. Herren v. Farm Sec. Admin., 153 F.2d 76, 78 (8th Cir. 1946).
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enacted, so that the "intent to waive immunity and the scope of
such a waiver [is] ascertained by reference to underlying congressional policy."2 7' Unfortunately, the rubric of strict construction has
sometimes obscured the essential meaning of a statutory waiver of
sovereign immunity, although the Supreme Court tends to find its
way back home to the central purpose of the statute as interpretive
questions recur across the decades and as the Court becomes more
familiar and more comfortable with a particular statutory waiver.
The adjudication history of the Tucker Act. before the Supreme
Court, from its nineteenth century enactment to the present, provides an illustrative example of the ebb and flow of strict construction over time in the context of a specific statutory waiver. As noted
earlier, because the legislative consent to suits for money damages
in the then-Court of Claims was enacted as part of a grant of subject
matter jurisdiction to a new tribunal, the Court's initial approach
was to impose not merely a strict but also a jurisdictional reading
to each statutory element.2 7 3 In that discussion, I suggested that
these early holdings may have reflected the Supreme Court's
uneasiness with what was then a new category of legislation, that
is, statutes which offered general consent to suits against the
government for categories of claims. In any event, the Court's
skeptical approach to this first major statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity extended well beyond implying jurisdictional status into
the accompanying statute of limitations. In the early decades, the
Court read the Tucker Act so narrowly as to effectively deprive a
central provision of any meaningful force as a remedy for the loss
of private property to the government. Over time, however, the
Court has rediscovered the judicial remedy originally intended
by Congress and, further, has moved away from a confining and
narrow definition of the Tucker Act cause of action, limiting the
strict approach to the initial question of whether sovereign
immunity has been waived, a question which of course is directly
answered by the Tucker Act itself.

271. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 521 (1984).
272. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000). On the Tucker Act as a waiver of sovereign immunity, see
supra Part I.B.1.
273. See supra Part II.B.2.
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When the Tucker Act was originally enacted in 1887,274 the
provision of a judicial review mechanism for claims that the federal
government had taken private property without just compensation
was most clearly within the contemplation of Congress. 2 75 In
addition to confirming the existing authority of the then-Court of
Claims to hear contract and statutory claims for money, the Tucker
Act enlarged the waiver of sovereign immunity to include claims
against the federal government "founded" on "the Constitution. 27 6
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, in
pertinent part, that no "private property [shall] be taken for public
use, without just compensation. '27 7
Nevertheless, for more than fifty years, the scope of the Tucker
Act was read narrowly to apply only to condemnation cases, that is,
when the government affirmatively sought to obtain title to property
and thus was effectively purchasing the property (albeit involuntarily from the seller's standpoint). Indeed, the Court construed the
Tucker Act so strictly that even a condemnation case did not give
rise to a direct claim in court for a taking of the property founded on
the Constitution. Instead, the Court implied a contractual promise
by the government to pay just compensation, thus allowing a
judicial remedy under the government contract jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims. 8 In United States v. Jones,27 9 the Court remarked
that "[t]he jurisdiction here given to the Court of Claims [in the
Tucker Act] is precisely the same as that given" in the earlier
statutes creating the Court of Claims, 28 ° thereby effectively discarding the legislative augmentation of judicial authority through the
Tucker Act to include claims founded upon the Constitution.2 8 ' As
274. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.).
275. Noone & Lester, supra note 60, at 575 & n.28.
276. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000) (waiving the federal government's sovereign immunity
for monetary claims "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort").
277. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
278. See United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1884); Paul Frederic
Kirgis, Section 1500 and the JurisdictionalPitfallsof FederalGovernment Litigation,47 AM.
U. L. REv. 301, 309 (1997).
279. 131 U.S. 1 (1889).
280. Id. at 16.
281. See Charles C. Binney, The Element of Tort as Affecting the Legal Liability of the
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one commentator stated early in the twentieth century, before the
change of jurisprudential course, the Court had "so construed the
Act as to limit very materially the broad terms of relief which the
Act appears to grant," with the result that "[p]ractically no case has
been able to stand" on the Constitution and every claim instead has
had to be proven as a contract, express or implied.28 2
During the latter half of the nineteenth century and well into the
twentieth century, if the government seized property (other than by
statutorily-authorized condemnation) or deprived individuals of the
use of their property, the Court treated the government's conduct as
a tort (such as trespass or wrongful appropriation).2 "3 The Tucker
Act specifically provides that the jurisdictional grant to the thenCourt of Claims, and the waiver for certain money claims against
'
the United States, applies only to "cases not sounding in tort."284
Accordingly, and appropriately because the condition is stated as
part of the jurisdictional grant, the courts have treated the tort
exception to the Tucker Act as limiting the jurisdiction of the federal
judiciary.28 8 As discussed earlier,28 6 no general waiver of sovereign
immunity for tortious injuries was enacted by Congress until the
Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946. As a consequence, during this
period, the Court left those who had suffered a taking of their
property by the federal government in the awkward position of
trying to file suit for specific relief, such as ejectment, against the
United States, 20 YALE L.J. 95, 99 (1910) (noting that the Court's statement in Jones "is
clearly inaccurate, as it makes no mention of claims founded upon the Constitution, and it
must be regarded as a dictum except in so far as it bears upon the precise question before the

court").
282. Borchard, supranote 45, at 29 & n. 115; see also Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S.
163, 167 (1894) (ruling that "[s]ome element of contractual liability must lie at the foundation
of every action" under the Tucker Act); Note, Developments in the Law: Remedies Against the
UnitedStates and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 876 (1957) ("T]he result of the decisions
was that the 'founded upon the Constitution' clause was entirely submerged into the clause
conferring jurisdiction over contract actions.").
283. See Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 166-67; Hill v. United States, 149 U.S. 593, 598 (1893);
Borchard, supranote 45, at 11 (saying that while governmental occupation of property "might
have been regarded as a taking of land for public use under the [C]onstitution," and thus
with resulting
falling within the Tucker Act, the Court "preferred to consider it a tort ...
immunity from suit").
284. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
285. Basso v. United States, 239 U.S. 602,606-07 (1916); Jentoftv. United States, 450 F.3d
1342, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

286. See supra Part I.B.2.
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individual government official in possession of the property, while
contending that sovereign immunity did not bar the suit because the
government officer was acting unconstitutionally.2 " As observed by
a mid-twentieth century commentary on these early decisions
barring most takings claims against the federal government under
the Tucker Act, "[t]he spirit of these decisions is indicated by the
maxim, often quoted even in recent years, that waivers of sovereign
immunity must be strictly construed.'"2"
Over time, the Supreme Court adopted a more hospitable
approach as it has become more familiar with this statutory waiver
of sovereign immunity, bringing about a correction of its earlier
missteps. In 1933, in Jacobs v. United States,2 89 which involved the
exercise of eminent domain by the federal government, the Court
forthrightly recognized the claim brought under the Tucker Act for
compensation (including interest) as being founded upon the
Constitution, rather than upon an implied contract.29 ° In 1946, the
Supreme Court abandoned its rigid approach to the Tucker Act and
held that seizures of property, even outside of the deliberate
exercise of eminent domain powers, were indeed takings under the

287. See Cramton, supranote 55, at 392 ("In the nineteenth century, prior to the enactment
of a profusion of statutory remedies, the action against the wrongdoing officer was the
mainstay of the system."). In an unwieldy attempt to accommodate the concept of sovereign
immunity while allowing some remedy for governmental wrongdoing, the Court indulged the
legal fiction that a suit for equitable relief against a government officer was not in substance
a claim against the government itself, notwithstanding that the officer acted for the
government, held property in the name of the government, and the relief granted directly
affected the government. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204-18 (1882). The Court
abandoned the officer suit fiction in Larson v. Domestic & ForeignCommerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682, 688 (1949) (plurality), holding that the Court must look to the relief sought in the suit
to determine whether, although nominally framed against an officer, the complaint in reality
is pressed against the federal government itself. See also Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643
(1962) (holding that, unless a government officer acts beyond statutory or constitutional
powers, the suit is one against the government itself and within the doctrine of federal
sovereign immunity). This clarification of the underlying sovereign immunity doctrine in turn
set the stage for renewed legislative consent to judicial review, including the expansive 1976
amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act that expressly waives the sovereign
immunity of the government and allows suits seeking judicial review of an agency's action to
be brought directly against the government itself. Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000)).
288. Developments in the Law, supra note 282, at 876.
289. 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
290. Id. at 16.
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Fifth Amendment and thus compensable under the Tucker Act, even
if they alternatively could be characterized as torts.291
The doctrinal change came in the first of the major airplane
overflight cases in which landowners adjoining airports made
claims for the damage caused by the noise and vibration of lowflying aircraft. 29 2 In United States v. Causby, 93 the owner of a
chicken farm sought compensation because the chickens were
literally being frightened to death by the noise of heavy bombers
overflying at sixty-five feet. Effectively overturning fifty years of
case law, the Court upheld jurisdiction under the Tucker Act for
claims alleging any form or manner of the taking of property rights
by the government: "If there is a taking, the claim is 'founded upon
the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims
to hear and determine. 2 94
Over the course of six decades, as the Supreme Court became
more comfortable with this landmark statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity and more respectful of its original legislative purpose in
providing a judicial remedy for certain constitutional wrongs, the
Court has journeyed a considerable distance in its sovereign
immunity jurisprudence. The Court abandoned early rulings that
effectively erased the textual provision for Constitution-based
claims from the Tucker Act and moved to openly accept claims
under the Act that allege any form of taking. Indeed, today, the
Supreme Court holds that the Tucker Act is presumptively available
in all cases where a person alleges that the federal government has
taken property without just compensation.2 9 5
Having confirmed the full range of the Tucker Act vehicle, including contract, statutory, and Constitution-based claims, the
primary question surrounding the Tucker Act in the past couple of
decades has been defining the cause of action afforded by this
291. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265-67 (1946).
292. See id. at 258.
293. Id. at 256.
294. Id. at 267; see also Kirgis, supra note 278, at 309 (explaining that "Causby discarded
the Court's prior jurisprudence" and held that a taking claim is founded on the Constitution
as provided in the Tucker Act).
295. See Presault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) (citing Causby as
confirming jurisdiction of the then-Claims Court over takings claims as founded upon the
Constitution and holding that the Tucker Act is presumptively available for all claims arising
out of a taking).
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waiver of sovereign immunity.29 6 For a relatively brief moment in
jurisprudential time, the Supreme Court appeared to disclaim the
Tucker Act as a waiver of sovereign immunity at all,297 a mistaken
retreat from its more generous approach that the Court fortunately
soon righted. In 1983, in United States v. Mitchell,29 8 the Supreme
Court clarified that the Tucker Act speaks both to subject matter
jurisdiction in the federal courts and to the amenability of the
United States to suit.299 However, beyond establishing jurisdiction
and waiving sovereign immunity, the Tucker Act does not create
substantive law or define the substance of a claim in and of itself. To
be cognizable under the Tucker Act, a claim must be based upon a
"money-mandating" provision in the Constitution or a statute or
regulation, that is, a provision that contemplates compensation in
money for a violation of the government's duty. °°
In addressing the question of the substantive right under the
Tucker Act, the Court has confirmed the loosening of the strictures
of construction as applied to familiar statutory waivers of sovereign
immunity and when the interpretive question moves beyond the
preliminary matters of whether a waiver exists for the general
category of claims and whether jurisdiction is assigned to a
particular federal forum. In its 2003 decision in United States v.
White Mountain Apache Tribe,30 1 the Supreme Court reiterated
that the Tucker Act claimant must premise the substantive right
to relief upon a statutory provision that "can fairly be interpreted
as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the
296. See generally SISK, supra note 58, § 4.04(b), at 257-61.
297. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (saying that a claimant must "look
beyond" the Tucker Act to find a waiver of sovereign immunity); United States v. Testan, 424
U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
298. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
299. Id. at 212-16.
300. See Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007-09 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (ruling
that the Tucker Act claimant must demonstrate that the source of substantive law he or she
relied upon "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government
for the damage sustained"); see also United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)
(adopting the money-mandating formulation from Eastport Steamship).
301. 537 U.S. 465(2003). For a detailed description ofthe White MountainApache decision
and the requirements for establishing an actionable fiduciary relationship for a breach of trust
claim by an Indian tribe against the federal government under the Tucker Act, see generally
Gregory C. Sisk, Yesterday and Today: Of Indians, Breach of Trust, Money, and Sovereign
Immunity, 39 TULSA L. REv. 313 (2003) (Indian Trust Doctrine Symposium).
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damage sustained. 30 2 The Court rejected the suggestion, however,
that this stage of the analysis should include the kind of strict
construction approach that would govern the preliminary inquiry
into whether a statute has been identified that waives federal
sovereign immunity. 3
Given that the Tucker Act itself accomplishes the waiver of
sovereign immunity, the White Mountain Apache Court said that
the 'fair interpretation' rule demands a showing demonstrably
lower than the standard for the initial waiver of sovereign immunity."30 4 In holding that the underlying statutory source of law need
only be "reasonably amenable to the reading that it mandates a
3 5 the Court deliberately adopted
right of recovery in damages,""
ordinary rules of statutory interpretation, as contrasted with the
stringent demand for an explicit statement applicable to the
preliminary stage of confirming the existence of a legislative waiver
of the government's sovereign immunity. Retaining a decent respect
for the sovereign United States, the Court nonetheless counseled
caution, saying that "[w]hile the premise to a Tucker Act claim will
not be 'lightly inferred,' a fair inference will do."3 6
Accordingly, at least as of the day before the January 8, 2008
decision in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,"' the
Supreme Court's interpretive approach toward the important and
broad waiver of sovereign immunity exemplified in the Tucker Act
has depended upon the stage of the analysis, with jurisdictional
expectations and strict construction being limited to the preliminary
core substantive inquiries. As a robust example in which the various
threads of case law appeared to come together just a few years ago,
in FranconiaAssociates v. United States °. the Court unanimously
302. White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. at 472 (internal quotation marks omitted).
303. See id. at 472-73. As Nell Jessup Newton observed two decades before the Court eased
the stringency of the analysis, if "the question [of a substantive right to relief under the
Tucker Act] is posed as a search for a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the doctrine
of strict construction must be addressed, and a general statute ...
has little chance of being
viewed as a waiver." Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-IndianTrust Relationship
After Mitchell, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 635, 656-57 (1982).
304. 537 U.S. at 472-73.
305. Id. at 473.
306. Id. (citation omitted).
307. 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008). For a discussion of the decision in John R. Sand and its
potential impact, see infra Part III.
308. 536 U.S. 129 (2002).
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found the requirement of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity
to be "satisfied" under the Tucker Act, meaning that the government
3 9 The prerequisites having
no longer was "cloaked with immunity.""
been satisfied, and thus the jurisdictional and strict construction
preliminaries having been satisfied as well, the FranconiaAssociates Court examined the question of accrual under the applicable
statute of limitations without presumptions or preconceptions. The
Court then concluded "that limitations principles should generally
apply to the Government 'in the same way that' they apply to
private parties."3 1
3. The Fadingof Strict Construction with Distance from the
Core Substance of the Waiver of Immunity
When the question before the Court is whether a new cause of
action has been recognized against the federal government or
whether Congress has authorized a new form of judicial relief, strict
construction continues to dominate the Court's sovereign immunity
jurisprudence, establishing a strong presumption against waiver
and demanding explicit statutory text to overcome that presumption.3" Even in this class of core substantive issues, the Court has
moved away from a mechanical application of the strict construction
rule that had sometimes suffocated a newly born legislative waiver
in its cradle, as was initially the case with the express Tucker Act
remedy for constitutional claims, as discussed immediately above.31 2
The Court is no longer willing to blind itself in the name of strict
construction to the luminous purpose of Congress in expanding
judicial remedies against the federal government.3 13 'The canon in
favor of strict construction is not an inexorable command to override

309. Id. at 141.
310. Id. at 145 (quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)). For
further discussion of FranconiaAssociates, see infra Part II.D.
311. See supra Part II.C.1.
312. See supra Part II.C.2.
313. See Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV.
405, 506 (1989) (suggesting, in what perhaps was an optimistic overstatement, that the
"[n]arrow construction of statutes abrogating sovereign immunity" is an "obsolete" canon of
statutory construction).
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As John Nagle

If the justification for sovereign immunity is to allow Congress
to determine the appropriate balance between protecting
government policymaking and providing remedies to those
injured by government actions, then the object of interpreting
statutory waivers of sovereign immunity should be to ascertain
and implement the deliberate balance achieved by Congress.31
The Supreme Court itself confirmed quite recently that "[t]he
'
sovereign immunity canon is just that-a canon of construction."3 16
As "a tool for interpreting the law," the Court explained that it
"never ... displaces the other traditional tools of statutory construc'
So understood, the rubric of strict construction is not a
tion."317
substitute for careful attention to the statutory language and
structure actually enacted by Congress or a basis for ignoring the
manifest purpose of the statutory waiver.
As we turn our examination away from the essential scope of a
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, and look at other statutory
standards, limitations, exceptions, and rules applicable to a suit
involving the government, it becomes even more apparent that strict
construction no longer overwhelms interpretation of every element
of a statute related to a waiver of sovereign immunity. In its less
dogmatic incarnation, the rule of strict construction is a supple tool
that assists, but does not dominate, interpretation. The strict
construction canon counsels caution and precludes an excessive
liberality at the expense of government prerogatives and appropriate administrative discretion. In this way, the forcefulness of strict
construction fades as we move farther away from the core substance

314. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1948) (addressing the maxim that penal
statutes are to be strictly construed); see also United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 541
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the rule of "clear statement of waivers of sovereign
immunity" does not "require explicit waivers to be given a meaning that is implausible" nor
permit "restricting the unequivocal language" of explicit waivers).
315. Nagle, supra note 268, at 818.
316. Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 128 S. Ct. 2007, 2017 (2008).
317. Id.
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of a statutory waiver, and its potency
may disappear altogether
31 8
when sufficient distance is reached.
One of the Supreme Court's most recent resolutions of an
interpretive dispute focused on an exception to a statutory waiver
of sovereign immunity and thus may serve as a model for the careful
approach toward which the Court is gravitating. In Dolan v. U.S.
Postal Service,31 the Supreme Court construed the exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act for "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss,
miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." 2 '
Over a dissent that emphasized strict construction,3 2' the majority
held the exception did not bar a resident's claim arising out of her
alleged injury in tripping over letters, packages, and periodicals that
had been negligently left on her porch by a mail carrier; rather, the
Court majority applied the exception more narrowly to a failure to
deliver mail or damage to its contents.32 2
In Dolan, the Court began by placing the statutory section in
context within the act as a whole, separating the exception at issue
from the core provisions that grant subject matter jurisdiction and
accomplish the central waiver of sovereign immunity.3 23 At the
beginning of the majority opinion, the Court observed that the
waiver of sovereign immunity for the FTCA comes in two sections
of the Code, the first of which "confers federal-court jurisdiction in
a defined category of cases involving negligence committed by
federal employees in the course of their employment," and the
second of which directs that the United States is liable in the same
manner as a private person under like circumstances but not for
prejudgment interest or punitive damages. 4 In a separate statutory
section, the Court observed that "[t]he FTCA qualifies its waiver of
sovereign immunity for certain categories of claims," through
thirteen exceptions.3 25

318. See infra Part II.D (discussing construction of procedural rules).
319. 546 U.S. 481 (2006).
320. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (2000). On the FTCA as a waiver of sovereign immunity, see supra
Part I.B.2.
321. Dolan, 546 U.S. at 492-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 485-92 (majority opinion).
323. Id. at 483-85.
324. Id. at 484-85 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674 (2000)).
325. Id. at 485.
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At the close of the majority opinion, the Dolan Court emphasized
that the nature of the statutory provision at issue affects the
manner in which it should be construed. Thus, the Court "noted that
this case does not implicate the general rule that 'a waiver of the
Government's sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in
terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign."'3 26 The Court explained
that "this principle is 'unhelpful' in the FTCA context, where
'unduly generous interpretations of the exceptions run the risk of
defeating the central purpose of the statute,' which 'waives the
Government's immunity from suit in sweeping language."'327
By contrast, the dissent argued that the rule of strict construction
dictated the outcome of the case, saying that "[e]ven if the exception
is ambiguous, this Court's cases require that ambiguities as to the
scope of the Government's waiver of immunity be resolved in its
favor."32' 8 Drawing upon both jurisdictional presumptions and the
rule of strict construction,3 29 the dissent insisted that "[t]he wellestablished rationale for construing a waiver in favor of the sovereign's immunity, thus, applies with equal force to the construction
of an exception to that waiver. '33' But on this occasion, the dissenting justice stood alone in invoking the rule of strict construction as
both applicable to and directing the result of the case.
The seven-justice majority in Dolan,331' having identified the
provision as an exception to the general waiver and thus as not
being readily amenable to resolution by the rule of strict construction, stated that "the proper objective of a court attempting to
construe one of the subsections of 28 U.S.C. § 2680 is to identify
'those circumstances which are within the words and reason of the
exception'-no less and no more. 3 32
326. Id. at 491 (quoting Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)).
327. Id. at 491-92 (citations omitted) (quoting Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853
n.9 (1984), and United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547 (1951)).
328. Id. at 493 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 498 (claiming that a court "may only exercise jurisdiction over the Government
pursuant to a 'clear statement"' of waiver and that the waiver will be "strictly construed" in
favor of the sovereign (quoting United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465,
472 (2003))).
330. Id.
331. One justice did not participate in the decision. Id. at 492.
332. Id. (majority opinion) (quoting Kosak, 465 U.S. at 853 n.9, which quoted Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 (1953)). In the Court's most recent decision addressing an
FTCA exception, Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831 (2008)-which held that the
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Focusing directly upon the statutory exception for the transmission of mail, the Dolan Court acknowledged that, "[i]f considered in
isolation, the phrase 'negligent transmission' could embrace a wide
range of negligent acts committed by the Postal Service in the
course of delivering mail, including creation of slip-and-fall hazards
from leaving packets and parcels on the porch of a residence. 3 33
However, the Court maintained, even in the context of a statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity, "[i]nterpretation of a word or phrase
depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the
purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents
or authorities that inform the analysis. '334 Given that the words
"negligent transmission" are accompanied by the terms "loss" and
"miscarriage," the Court concluded that all of these terms refer to
"failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in a timely manner
'
to the right address."3 35
Moreover, the Court cited longstanding
precedent, which in turn was firmly grounded in the legislative
history 36 and which confirmed that a primary objective of the FTCA
was to waive sovereign immunity for claims arising out of automobile accidents, particularly the negligent operation of motor vehicles
by postal workers while delivering the mail. 337 Based on text,
context, and legislative intent as reflected in existing precedent, the
Court concluded that the exception excludes governmental liability
exception for damage to detained property in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) immunized negligence not
only by customs officials, but by other law enforcement personnel, such as prison guardsneither the majority nor the dissent made any reference to strict construction.
333. Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 486-87.
336. The most often repeated example for appropriate governmental liability found in the
legislative history of the FTCA was that of"negligence in the operation of vehicles." H.R. REP.
NO. 76-2428, at 3 (1940); Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 66 (1942); Tort Claims Against the United States:
Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before the Subcomm. No.1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th
Cong. 7, 16, 17 (1940); Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearingson S. 2690 Before a
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 9 (1940); 86 CONG. REC. 12,024
(1940); 69 CONG. REC. 2192, 2193, 3118 (1928); see also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15, 28 (1953) (noting that car accident cases were the kind of ordinary tort "[u]ppermost in the
collective mind of Congress").
337. Dolan, 546 U.S. at 487-88 (citing Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 855 (1984));
see Kosak, 465 U.S. at 855 ("One of the principal purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act was
to waive the Government's immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto accidents
in which employees of the Postal System were at fault.").
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"only for injuries arising, directly or consequentially, because mail
either fails to arrive at all or arrives late, in damaged condition, or
at the wrong address."3'38 Finally, the Court recognized that practical
aspects of the matter may shed light on the probable congressional
intent, namely that harms arising from damage or untimely
delivery of postal material "are the sort primarily identified with the
Postal Service's function of transporting mail throughout the United
States" and that losses of this nature. "are at least to some degree
avoidable or compensable through postal registration and insur339
ance."
The Dolan holding should not be misunderstood as locating a new
touchstone, replacing the trump card of strict construction in favor
of the government for the talisman of generous construction in favor
of the claimant whenever a provision might be labeled as an
exception or limitation, separate and secondary to the general
waiver of sovereign immunity. The heavy-lifting of interpretation
by the courts cannot be avoided. While the distance of a provision
from the core substantive waiver may be roughly proportional to the
forcefulness of the strict construction rubric, measuring that
distance requires nuanced and contextual appreciation of each
provision within a statutory scheme. Even with respect to the
exceptions to the FTCA, where a narrowing construction generally
is better suited to uphold the broad legislative purpose behind the
waiver, the Dolan Court cautioned that "[o]ther FTCA exceptions
paint with a far broader brush."34 The Court thereby concentrated
attention where it always belongs, on the text of the provision at
issue.
And it is always essential to have a complete understanding of
the particular legislative consent to suit, its animating purpose, the
legislative intent underlying it, its place within the overall tapestry
of statutory waivers, and the purpose and practical effect of any
limitations or exceptions. "Some waivers are broad," John Nagle
reminds us, "others are narrow. '' 341

338.
339.
340.
341.

Dolan, 546 U.S. at 489.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 489.
Nagle, supra note 268, at 828.
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D. Applying ProceduralRules for Suits Against the Sovereign in
the Same Manner as with PrivateParties
That the Supreme Court's recent course has been in the direction
of a less jaundiced approach toward statutory waivers of sovereign
immunity is especially well marked in cases involving procedural
regulation of the mode of litigation as contrasted with the substantive scope of waiver legislation.34 2 As discussed earlier, in its early,
awkward encounters with this new form of legislation, the Court
had fallen back on jurisdictional rules, even for such procedural
provisions as time limitations,34 3 an approach which persisted
even into the twentieth century.3 44 However, the Court has since
retreated from the jurisdictional rigidification of every word and
phrase contained within a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.3 45 The Court's more recent decisions appear to reserve a strict
and jurisdictional construction to those aspects of a statutory waiver
of sovereign immunity that define the basic nature and scope of the
claim,34 while applying procedural requirements in the same
manner as among private parties.3 4 7
The contrasting interpretive approaches taken toward core
substantive elements of a legislative waiver versus procedural
provisions are vividly illustrated in a pair of decisions involving the
342. See Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 667-68 (1996) (describing as having "a
distinctly facilitative, 'procedural' cast," those provisions that "deal with case processing, not
substantive rights or consent to suit").
343. See supra Part II.B.2.
344. See Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 501 (1967) ("It is also true that in many cases this
Court has read procedural rules embodied in statutes waiving [sovereign] immunity strictly,
with an eye to effectuating a restrictive legislative purpose when Congress relinquishes
sovereign immunity.").
345. See supra Part II.B.3.
346. Id.
347. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31-32 & n.26 (1953) (saying that, "[w]here
jurisdiction was clear" under the FTCA, the Court has "allowed recovery despite arguable
procedural objections," such as by allowing the United States to be sued in tort for
contribution and impleaded as a third-party); see also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340
U.S. 543, 554-56 (1951) (rejecting the government's strict construction argument and instead
holding that the federal government may be impleaded as a third-party defendant under the
FTCA by another tortfeasor seeking contribution); United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338
U.S. 366, 380-83 (1949) (rejecting the government's strict construction argument and holding
that the government may be sued under the FTCA by a subrogee just as would a private
defendant).
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very same statutory waiver--employment discrimination claims
against the federal government under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.48 On the one hand, in Library of Congress v. Shaw,3 49
the Supreme Court strictly construed the amenability of the United
States to suit under Title VII and declined to hold the government
liable for the prejudgment interest absent express congressional
consent.350 As discussed previously,"' the Library of Congress
decision fits comfortably within the strict construction regime as
precluding judicial implication of new causes of action or new
remedies without a clear statutory statement. On the other hand,
in Irwin v. Departmentof VeteransAffairs,5 2 the Court held that the
limitations period on claims against the United States arising under
that same statute-Title VII-need not be strictly enforced and
allowed equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in the same
manner as in cases among private litigants.35 3
In past writings, I have fretted that the conflicting outcomes in
this precedential pair construing the very same statutory waiver of
immunity are difficult to reconcile and thus "reflect[] continuing
tension about how to interpret statutes authorizing suit against the
federal government., 354 The Court has yet to explicitly reconcile
these decisions and explain the decline of strict construction in the
procedural category. Nonetheless, the resilience and extension of
the Irwin approach to other time limitations, as well as the Court's
extrapolation of the general Irwin stance to issues beyond the
particular question of equitable tolling of a limitations period,
suggest the Court does conceive of procedural and case-processing
regulations as a distinct category of rules in which the federal

348. On Title VII as a waiver of sovereign immunity, see supra Part I.B.3. On the contrast
between these two decisions interpreting Title VII as applied to the federal government, see
generally SISK, supra note 58, § 2.03, at 95-99.
349. 478 U.S. 310 (1986).
350. Id. at 317-19. Subsequently, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §
114, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (2000)), Congress
carefully used literal language to expressly allow awards of prejudgment interest in Title VII
employment discrimination suits against the federal government, thereby overturning Library
of Congressv. Shaw in the specific context of that particular statutory cause of action.
351. See supra Part II.C.1.
352. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
353. Id. at 93-96.
354. SISK, supra note 58, § 2.03, at 97; Sisk, supra note 44, at 465.
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government should be treated in the same manner as a private
person.
If, as I believe the case law confirms, a separate procedural
category justifying a different interpretive posture is emerging in
the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence, the Irwin decision
will be remembered as the prime generator. As discussed earlier in
the context of jurisdiction,3 55 the Court in Irwin rejected the lower
court's ruling that a statute of limitations on a waiver of sovereign
immunity was an absolute jurisdictional limit and instead allowed
the limitations period for filing an employment discrimination
claim against the federal government under Title VII to be equitably tolled.3 56 The Court thus plainly withdrew the time bar from the
class of jurisdictional absolutes. Moreover, departing from the
traditional rule of strict construction, the Court held generally that
"making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the
Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits,
amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver." ' 7
For a brief period, the Supreme Court appeared to be retreating
from the Irwin presumption in favor of equitable tolling of statutes
of limitations against the federal government, raising the prospect
that Irwin might be confined to its particular statutory context. In
United States v. Brockamp,5 8 the Court found that the statutory
limitations period on filing claims for tax refunds could not be
equitably tolled, because the tax statute's "detail, its technical
language, the iteration of the limitations in both procedural and
substantive forms, and the explicit listing of exceptions, taken
together, indicate to [the Court] that Congress did not intend courts
to read other unmentioned, open-ended, 'equitable' exceptions into

355. See supra Part II.B.3.
356. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 93-96.
357. Id. at 95. Four years before Irwin, setting the stage for a departure from strict
construction in the procedural context but without setting forth any general guidance, the
Court in Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986), had allowed equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations governing judicial review in Social Security disability cases. Id. at 478.
In City of New York, the Court explained that it "must be careful not to 'assume the authority
to narrow the waiver [of sovereign immunity] that Congress intended,' or construe the waiver
'unduly restrictively."' Id. at 479 (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118 (1979),
and Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983)).
358. 519 U.S. 347 (1997).
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the statute that it wrote."35' 9 In United States v. Beggerly,6 ° the
Court held that equitable tolling is not available in a suit against
the United States under the Quiet Title Act,3" 1 which provides an
"unusually generous" twelve-year limitations period and already
incorporates a form of tolling by delaying the start of the period
until the plaintiff should have known that the United States was
making a claim upon the property.36 2 Still, even in holding that a
particular statute placing a time limitation on a claim against the
federal government was not amenable to equitable tolling, the Court
reached that conclusion based upon a careful examination of the
statutory language and assessment of legislative intent-not by
characterizing the statute of limitations as a jurisdictional requirement36 3 or by reciting a formulaic commitment to strict construction.
Subsequently, in Scarborough v. Principi,3" the Court relied
upon Irwin as instructive in another context that also involved a
time limitation contained in a waiver of sovereign immunity. In
Scarborough,the Court held that an otherwise timely application
for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)365
that did not contain the statutorily required allegation that the
government's position was not "substantially justified" may be
amended to cure this defect after the thirty-day filing period had
expired.36 6 In so holding, the Court found the Irwin decision to be
"enlightening on this issue," because that precedent recognized
that limitation principles should apply to the federal government
in the same way as to private parties.36 7 The Court further said that

359. Id. at 352.
360. 524 U.S. 38 (1998).
361. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2000).
362. Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 48-49.
363. That Congress may have designed a particular statute of limitations to be mandatory
and not subject to deviation does not make it a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be
waived or forfeited. See Farzana K. v. Ind. Dep't of Educ., 473 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 2007)
('The law is full of rules that are mandatory in the sense that courts must enforce them
punctiliously if a litigant insists. Rules are not jurisdictional, however, no matter how
unyielding they may be, unless they set limits on the federal courts' adjudicatory
competence."). See generally Dodson, supra note 152, at 11.
364. 541 U.S. 401 (2004).
365. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000). On the EAJA as a waiver of sovereign immunity, see supra
Part II.B.1.
366. Scarborough,541 U.S. at 420-21.
367. Id.
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"[o]nce Congress waives sovereign immunity, [as] observed [in
Irwin], judicial application of a time prescription to suits against the
Government, in the same way the prescription is applicable to
private suits, 'amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver."'" 6 8
The Irwin presumption that a time limitation should be applied
in government cases in the same manner as in private litigation has
been taken beyond the original question of whether a statutory time
period may be equitably adjusted. In FranconiaAssociates v. United
States,36 9 the Supreme Court unanimously held that ordinary rules
for when a claim accrues should apply under a statute of limitations
governing contract claims before the Court of Federal Claims." °
Rejecting the government's plea in that case for a "special" rule of
accrual to benefit the sovereign, the Court characterized the
government's proposition as "present[ing] an 'unduly restrictiv[e]'
reading of the congressional waiver of sovereign immunity, rather
368. Id. at 421 (quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)). Justices
Thomas and Scalia dissented in Scarborough, arguing that the time limitation was "a
condition on the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity," and thus was subject to the
strict construction rule. Id. at 425-27 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent sought to
distinguish Irwin as applying only "where the Government is made subject to suit to the same
extent and in the same manner as private parties are." Id. at 426. The majority in
Scarboroughrejected the argument that Irwin is "instructive only in situations with a readily
identifiable private-litigation equivalent." Id. at 422 (majority opinion). In any event, private
litigation analogies arereadily available for most claims under statutory waivers of sovereign
immunity, including Title VII employment discrimination claims, the FTCA, and many claims
that fall under the Tucker Act, such as contract claims and even claims for just compensation
for a taking of property (which could be analogized to a trespass or a contract to purchase the
property). Moreover, adoption of a private litigation equivalent for the type of claim as
controlling the application of a time bar under a statutory waiver becomes problematic in the
context of a general statute of limitations. Consider the statute of limitations for the Court
of Federal Claims, 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2000), which applies to a wide diversity of claims. See
supra Part II.B.2; infra Part III.C. A single statute of limitations presumably should be
interpreted the same for all types of claims. The alternative would be to assume that a general
statute of limitations behaves like an excitable electron orbiting around the nucleus of an
atom. By this theory, when the atom is energized by a claim against the sovereign without an
apparent private parallel, the statute of limitations electron would make the quantum leap
to a higher jurisdictional and strict construction orbit. But when the claim is one with a
private counterpart, the statute of limitations electron drops down to a lower and ordinary
orbit. Such basic and typical litigation questions as the application of a statute of limitations
in a federal government case should not be decided according to the uncertain probabilistic
theories of quantum physics.
369. 536 U.S. 129 (2002).
370. Id. at 145 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2000)).
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than 'a realistic assessment of legislative intent."'3 71 Drawing on its
earlier decision in Irwin, the Court declared "that limitations
principles should generally apply to the Government 'in the same
' Accordingly, the Court
way that' they apply to private parties."3 72
directed that determination of when a claim accrues for purposes of
the statute of limitations should proceed in the same manner and
under the same legal principles as would apply in a suit among
private parties.37 3
The Court's treatment of such case-processing rules in a manner
consistent with ordinary expectations arising in private litigation,
in contrast with its more stringent approach toward those statutory
provisions that grant permission to sue the sovereign and define
the scope of cognizable claims, reflects an appreciation of the
distinct differences between these types of provisions and the
contrast in public policy implications. The purposes underlying a
general statute of limitations are essentially equivalent for either
the federal government or a private party. Statutes of limitations
"are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from
litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his
defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost."3'74 The primary purpose of a
statute of limitations is fairness to the defendant and efficiency of
the litigation process,.7 5 rather than protection of the sovereign
government from unconsented claims. The animating principles
behind a statute of limitations do not justify special rules in favor
of the government, whether in terms of measurement of the time of
accrual or the traditional rules of waiver or forfeiture when the

371. Id. (citation omitted).
372. Id. (quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)); see also Irwin,
498 U.S. at 95-96 (stating that "[o]nce Congress has made such a waiver [of immunity
covering a particular type of claim]," then the principle of equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations should be "applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is
applicable to private suits").
373. FranconiaAssocs., 536 U.S. at 145.
374. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); see also CONG. GLOBE, 36th
Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1860) (statement of Sen. Bayard) (describing the proposed statute of
limitations for the Court of Claims as based on the concern that "the transaction [may be] so
remote, and the evidence so imperfect, that the Government cannot meet it").
375. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944);
Note, Developments in the Law-Statutesof Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
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timeliness of an action is left unchallenged in an answering
pleading or otherwise is conceded.
Confirming that procedural rules in federal government cases
generally apply in the same manner as in private litigation, the
Supreme Court has ruled that auxiliary matters governing the
process of litigation are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, even to the extent of overriding conflicting statutory
directives. In Henderson v. United States,3 76 the Court found an
irreconcilable conflict between a provision in the Suits in Admiralty
Act,377 which previously required that service of a suit against the
government be made "forthwith,' 3 7' and Rule 4 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which allows 120 days for service.3 79 Finding that
the "forthwith" service requirement was neither jurisdictional nor
substantive,38 ° and notwithstanding the dissent's invocation of strict
construction canons as mandating fastidious observation of the
statutory rule,3 81 the Court majority ruled that the limitation on
service contained within a waiver of sovereign immunity was
superseded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act. 382 The Court explained that the
"essential purpose" of a service requirement "is auxiliary, a purpose
distinct from the substantive matters aired in the precedent on
which the dissent, wrenching cases from context, extensively
relies-who may sue,
on what claims, for what relief, within what
38 3
period.
limitations
376. 517 U.S. 654 (1996).
377. On the Suits in Admiralty Act as a waiver of sovereign immunity, see supra Part
II.B.2.
378. Act of Mar. 9, 1920, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525, 526 (repealed 2006).
379. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
380. Henderson, 517 U.S. at 668. Two justices concurred, arguing that Congress had the
power to condition a waiver of sovereign immunity upon strict compliance with a procedural
provision, although not explaining how the jurisdictional or absolute character of a statutory
procedural rule would be discerned. Id. at 672-73 (Scalia, J., concurring).
381. Id. at 673, 675 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[als a statutory condition on the
Government's waiver of its immunity," the statutory rule "demands strict compliance and
delimits the district court's jurisdiction to entertain" the suit, and that, under the traditional
principle of strict construction, "ambiguity must always be resolved in favor of the
Government").
382. Id. at 663-71 (majority opinion) (citing Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), which
provides that federal rules of procedure "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right").
383. Id. at 671 (footnotes omitted). The Henderson Court did identify the "limitations
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In sum, in a number of cases over the past two decades, the
Supreme Court has directed that procedural rules, including statutes of limitations, that regulate adjudication of suits against the
federal government should generally be construed in conformity
with the standards applicable to private disputes.
But then came John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,3"
which reaffirmed ancient precedent imposing a nonwaivable jurisdictional status on the statute of limitations applicable to an
early statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. That decision and its
potential meaning for the future is the subject of the next part of
this Article.

III. BEING SET BACK ADRIFT: THE FUTURE COURSE OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY JURISPRUDENCE AFTER JOHNR. SAND

Just as the formerly disparate strains of case law arising from a
diversity of statutory voices appeared to be coming together in a
harmonious regime for interpretation of legislative consent to suit,
a discordant note was sounded in the Supreme Court's early 2008
decision in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States.8 5 Even as
the Court forthrightly acknowledged that recent decades had
witnessed "a turn in the course of the law" and a shift in the
presumptions that apply in interpretation of statutory waivers of
sovereign immunity, the Court nonetheless invoked stare decisis to
justify adherence to "[tihose older cases [that] have consequently
become anomalous.""8 The Court thereby resurrected the nineteenth-century line of decisions that had judicially implied a
jurisdictional condition onto statutes of limitations in federal

period" as being among substantive statutory matters, but the Court was differentiating
between "substance" and "procedure" for the distinct purpose of determining which statutory
matters could be superseded by a federal court rule. Id. at 664-71. That a statute of
limitations is regarded as "substantive" and not subject to being overridden by a courtadopted rule does not mean that such a provision is not properly regarded as a procedural
claims-processing rule for purposes of a statutory construction approach. The Henderson
decision did not question the Irwin-Franconiapresumption that a statute of limitations in a
federal government case should be applied in government cases in the same manner as in
private litigation.
384. 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 756.
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government cases. 8 7 Once the nature and degree of the Court's
departure from the path set out in recent decades is fully understood,388 the question remains whether the John R. Sand decision
will prove to be a significant obstacle to the continuing development
of a coherent federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence.3 89
A. The Statute of Limitationsfor the Court of Federal Claims in
Textual and Historical Context: Setting the Stage for
John R. Sand
In 1863, Congress granted the then-Court of Claims authority to
enter binding judgments3 9 ° and first introduced a six-year limitations period."91 When the Court of Claims had been created in 1855,
no statute of limitations was included in the original authorizing
legislation.3 92 Thus, when considering whether to enlarge the
judicial authority of the Court of Claims, Congress naturally
concluded that a statute of limitations should be added to protect
against stale claims. As the 1862 legislative report explained: "A
man who neglects his business for six years cannot complain of the
government for refusing his suit; and there is no doubt that a
statute of limitations is even more demanded in justice to the
government than it is to private individuals. ' 93
Once having agreed that a statute of limitations should be
adopted, however, members of Congress in the early 1860s expressed the sense that such a time bar should be applied in
government cases in the same manner as for private parties. One
leading senator stated: "As this bill proposes to throw open this
court to all claimants, I think the same statute of limitations ought
to be applied to existing claims as would be applied between private
individuals., 394 The chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee
justified the inclusion of a statute of limitations "because there can
be no reason whatever for acts of limitation as between citizen and
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

See supra Part II.B.2.
See infra Parts III.A-B.
See infra Part III.C.
On the history of the Court of Claims, see supra Part I.B.1.
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 10, 12 Stat. 765, 767.
See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
H.R. REP. No. 37-34, at 3 (1862).
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 414 (1863) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
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citizen ... which does not apply as between Government and
citizen."3 9
Congressional debates preceding enactment of the 1863 legislation highlighted the controversial question of jurisdiction-but
always in terms of the authority of the Court of Claims to hear
certain types of legal claims and the nature of the remedy against
the government that should be cognizable before that tribunal. 96
Members of Congress thus well understood the concept of subject
matter jurisdiction and used the term in its ordinary sense of
judicial power over a class of claims. By contrast, no participant in
the legislative process ascribed jurisdictional status to the statute
of limitations that would apply to those claims that were found to
come within the jurisdictional authority of the Court of Claims.
The strongest evidence that the 1863 time bar was an ordinary
statute of limitations lay in the language that Congress selected:
"[E]very claim against the United States, cognizable by the court of
claims, shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a
statement of the claim be filed in the court or transmitted to it
under the provisions of this act within six years after the claim first
accrues."39' 7 The phrasing of this provision was comparable to that
found in many state statutes of limitations of the period.39 Had
395. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1860) (statement of Sen. Bayard).
396. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 37-34, at 3 (reporting that the bill would give to the Court of
Claims "jurisdiction of all claims for which the government would be liable in law or equity
were it liable to be sued in courts of justice," with certain exceptions, and that "[jiurisdiction
is also given to the court of all set-offs, counter-claims, and claims for damages, whether
liquidated or unliquidated on the part of the government against the claimant"); CONG.
GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 983 (statement of Sen. Bayard) (explaining that the committee
bill "enlarges the jurisdiction of the court, so as to give it all jurisdiction over all claims proper
against the Government, whether founded on contract or on act of Congress; or founded upon
legal or equitable obligation, according to the general principles of law"); CONG. GLOBE, 36th
Cong., 1st Sess. 985 (statement of Sen. Benjamin) (proposing"exclu[sion] from the jurisdiction
of the Court of Claims those claims which are purely political in their character"); CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 124 (statement of Rep. Porter) (stating that the proposed
bill "enlarges the jurisdiction of the court, by extending it to all claims for which the
Government would be liable in law or equity if it were suable in courts of justice"); CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 304 (statement of Sen. Fessenden) (criticizing the proposal as
"giv[ing] away the whole jurisdiction and power of Congress over claims against the
Government" to the court); id. at 395 (1863) (statement of Sen. Clark) (proposing "not [to] give
the court jurisdiction of anything except things arising under the law of Congress, or an
express or implied contract").
397. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 10, 12 Stat. 765, 767.
398. See JOSEPH K ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND SUITS
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Congress wished to create a "super" statute of limitations--one that
would impose itself on the agenda of a court even when the government had conceded its nonapplicability or waived its assertion-one
would have expected different, more direct, and more forceful
language to have been crafted to achieve that extraordinary
jurisdictional purpose.
After the 1948 revision and codification of Title 28 of the United
States Code,399 section 2501 of Title 28 now reads, in pertinent part:
"Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims
has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed
within six years after such claim first accrues. 4 °° In plain language,
§ 2501 bars a claim that has been filed more than six years after the
claim accrues, when the claim already is one that falls within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.40 1 In other words, § 2501
IN EQuITY AND ADMIRALTY, xxxiii to clxi (4th ed. 1861) (setting out state statutes of
limitations).
399. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869. When Congress recodified Title 28 of the
United States Code (the Judicial Code) in 1948, § 2501 was placed in a procedural chapter,
separate in location and distinctly different in language from the jurisdictional chapter.
Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492-1509 (2000) (organized under Part IV-Jurisdiction and Venue,
ch. 91 ("United States Court of Federal Claims")) (containing sixteen sections expressly
defining and limiting the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims), with 28
U.S.C. §§ 2501-2522 (2000) (organized under Part VI-Particular Proceedings, ch. 165
("United States Court of Federal Claims Procedure")) (including § 2501, the statute of
limitations). Despite the structural change and intent of the revisers in designating the
statute of limitations as procedural, an uncodified section of the 1948 Act provides that "[n]o
inference of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 28,
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, as set out in section 1 of this Act, in which any section is
placed, nor by reason of the catchlines used in such title." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 33,
62 Stat. 869, 991. For further discussion of and a suggestion for repeal of this little-known
provision, see Gregory C. Sisk, Lifting the Blindfold from Lady Liberty: Allowing Judges To
See the Structure in the Federal Judicial Code (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
400. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2000). The 1863 predecessor statute used the term "cognizable," Act
of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 10, 12 Stat. 765, 767, while the statute as currently codified speaks
of the Court of Federal Claims as having "jurisdiction." The word "cognizable" means "within
[the] jurisdiction of [a] court or power given to [a] court to adjudicate [a] controversy." FDIC
v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 259 (6th ed. 1990)).
Accordingly, in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, the Court said that it would not
presume this revision worked a change in the substantive law without a clear expression by
Congress. 128 S. Ct. 750, 754-55 (2008). As neither party suggested that "has jurisdiction" and
'cognizable by" were anything other than synonymous, the Court unsurprisingly found "no
such expression of intent here" to change the meaning based solely on its text. Id. at 755.
401. See Grass Valley Terrace v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 341, 347 (2005) (Damich, C.J.)
(referring to this understanding as the "plain English interpretation of the statute"); see also
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman,
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speaks in procedural terms of the potential infirmity of the claim as
dependent upon the date of its filing, rather than in jurisdictional
terms about the essential authority of the court. By its explicit text,
then, § 2501 does not limit the jurisdictional power of the court,
because it assumes that the court's jurisdictional authority over the
class of claims has already been confirmed under a jurisdictional
statute. Instead, § 2501 is best read as imposing an affirmative
defense against continuation of the litigation properly filed in the
Court of Federal Claims when a claim is untimely.
The long and consistent characterization in American common
law of statutes of limitations as nonjurisdictional and waivable rules
also suggests that Congress, in enacting the 1863 predecessor to
§ 2501, did not intend to elevate it to an unusual jurisdictional
status. Congressional intent with respect to a statutory provision
should be understood in light of the contemporary legal context and
the teachings of the common law.4 °2 Recognizing § 2501 as a
nonjurisdictional and waivable statute of limitations comports with
the well-established characterization in American common law of
such time bars as procedural rather than substantive. The leading
American treatise on statutes of limitations in 1863 explained:
Without destroying, therefore, and simply prescribing a period
in which a right may be enforced; and withholding merely the
remedy, after the lapse of an appointed time, for reasons of
private justice and public policy, a statute of limitations, it has
been uniformly40 3considered, is no violation of the sacredness of
private rights.

J., dissenting) ("The text of the statute confirms that the limitations period is applied to
claims of which the Court of Federal Claims already 'has jurisdiction."), affd, 128 S. Ct. 750
(2008); Wasserman, supra note 171, at 218 ("Properly read, [§ 2501] addresses the time for
bringing claims and not the jurisdiction of the Court of [Federal] Claims.").
402. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 705-06 (2004) (observing that "[wihen the
F'TCA was passed, the dominant principle in choice-of-law analysis for tort cases was lex loci
delicti: courts generally applied the law of the place where the injury occurred," which
provides a "specific reason to believe" that Congress intended the foreign country exception,
28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000), to bar claims where the injury or harm occurred in a foreign
country so as to thereby preclude application of foreign law); Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1992) (saying that the Court must "evaluate the state of the
law" when Congress passed the legislation, including the common-law traditions that form
the backdrop against which Congress acted).
403. ANGELL, supra note 398, § 22, at 17.
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This understanding of statutes of limitations as affecting the
remedy and not the underlying right of action was consistently
reiterated by the Supreme Court during the period when the 1863
statute of limitations was enacted.4" 4 As the Supreme Court later
explained in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,4 °5 the traditional rule in
America was that "the bar of the statute does not extinguish the
4 6 A
underlying right but merely causes the remedy to be withheld.""
statute of limitations, thus, has been a classic example of an
affirmative defense left to the defendant to raise and establish and
40 7
subject to waiver or forfeiture.
Unfortunately, as outlined earlier,40 8 a misguided series of
Supreme Court decisions from the late nineteenth century, 409 and
cited into the twentieth century,4 10 suggested that the 1863 predecessor statute of limitations for cases in the then-Court of Claims
had jurisdictional force. These decisions failed to carefully analyze
the plain directive of the text, ignored the legislative history, and
neglected the ubiquitous legal understanding of a statute of
limitations as a waivable affirmative defense. This line of cases
imported jurisdictional concepts into this statute of limitations
contrary to the legal norms of the period and without any indication
of legislative intent to contravene the common !-ga!understanding.

404. See, e.g., Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 624-29 (1885); Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S.
(9 How.) 407, 413 (1850); M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 327-28 (1839).
405. 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
406. Id. at 725.
407. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (listing "statute of limitations" as among the "affirmative
defenses" that a defendant "shall set forth affirmatively"); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198,
205 (2006) ("A statute of limitations defense ... is not 'jurisdictional,' hence courts are under
no obligationto raise the time bar sua sponte."); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
385, 393 (1982) (stating that, rather than being "a jurisdictional prerequisite ...
a statute of
limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling").
408. See supra Part II.B.2.
409. See, e.g., Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227,232-33 (1887); Kendall v. United States,
107 U.S. 123, 125 (1883).
410. See Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 273-75 (1957). Under this rule which had
its origins in Kendall, Finn, and Soriano, "the terms of (the] waiver of sovereign immunity
define the extent of the court's jurisdiction" and '[w]hen waiver legislation contains a statute
of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign
immunity."' United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834,841 (1986) (quoting Block v. North Dakota,
461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983)).
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This early jurisdictional error appeared to have been corrected in
recent decades, however, as also discussed in some detail earlier.4 1 1
In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,4" 2 the Supreme Court
cast aside its prior jurisdiction-bound approach and ruled that, in
terms of equitable tolling, statutes of limitations in federal government cases should be applied in the same way as in private suits.4" 3
With specific and disapproving reference to an earlier case treating
§ 2501, the Court of Claims statute of limitations,4 "4 as a jurisdictional bar, the Irwin Court acknowledged that "previous cases
dealing with the effect of time limits in suits against the Govern' While observing that an
ment have not been entirely consistent."4 15
argument could be made that the language of § 2501 "is more
stringent" than that in the Title VII limitations provision at issue
in Irwin, the Court was "not persuaded that the difference between
them is enough to manifest a different congressional intent with
respect to the availability of equitable tolling."4 6 Instead of "a
continuing effort on our part to decide each case on an ad hoc basis,
as we appear to have done in the past," the Court said that Irwin
"affords us an opportunity to adopt a more general rule to govern
the applicability of equitable tolling in suits against the Government."4 7' Accordingly, the Court in Irwin made a deliberate and
conscientious turn away from the obdurate jurisdictional approach
reflected in earlier cases.41 8

411. See supra Part II.B.3.
412. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
413. Id. at 94-95.
414. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2000).
415. Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94 (1990) (citing Soriano v. United
States, 352 U.S. 270 (1957)). Soriano, which refused to permit equitable tolling under § 2501,
was grounded upon and shared in the mistaken jurisdictional characterization of the statute
of limitations adopted in such early decisions as Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123, 125
(1883). See Soriano, 352 U.S. at 273-74 (relying primarily on Kendall in refusing to permit
equitable tolling of § 2501).
416. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95.
417. Id.
418. See id. at 94-95; see also id. at 98 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (saying that the decision "directly overrules a prior decision by this Court, Soriano
v.United States, 352 U.S. 270 (1957)"); Wood-Ivey Sys. Corp. v. United States, 4 F.3d 961, 964
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (concluding that, with Irwin, "the Supreme Court now considers [Soriano]
obsolete if not overturned"); Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25, 29 n.4 (1st Cir. 1993)
(recognizing that Irwin "overruled or made irrelevant" Soriano).
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Even more directly on point with respect to the statute of
limitations for the Court of Federal Claims is the Supreme Court's
decision in Franconia Associates v. United States.4 19 After reexamining the text and historical context of the predecessor statute,
the Court unanimously declared § 2501 to be an "unexceptional"
statute of limitations, comparable in text to "[a] number of contemporaneous [nineteenth century] state statutes of limitations
42 The Court
applicable to suits between private parties.""
described
the government's request in FranconiaAssociates for a special rule
of accrual under § 2501 as an "'unduly restrictiv[e]"' reading of the
congressional waiver of sovereign immunity, rather than 'a realistic
assessment of legislative intent,"' and affirmed that 'limitations
principles should generally apply to the Government 'in the same
way that' they apply to private parties. 4 21
Thus, after the Irwin decision in 1990 and before 2008, the
nineteenth-century decisions converting a statute of limitations into
a jurisdictional limitation on suits against the sovereign, mistaken
as they were at the time and now made anachronistic in light of
today's jurisprudence, appeared to have been washed away with the
tide.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in John R. Sand
In its 2008 decision in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States,4 22 the Supreme Court considered whether the statute of
limitations in § 2501 of Title 28 of the United States Code, which
applies to civil litigation against the federal government in the
Court of Federal Claims,4 23 should be treated as jurisdictional and
thus as imposing a duty on the courts to adjudicate the accrual of
the claim and application of the time limitation, even when the
parties had agreed that no procedural obstacles remain to the
action.4 24

419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.

536 U.S. 129 (2002).
Id. at 145.
Id. (citations omitted).
128 S. Ct. 750 (2008).
28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2000).
John R. Sand, 128 S. Ct. at 751-52.
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John R. Sand & Gravel Company ("John R. Sand") operates a
sand, gravel, and stone quarry on land it leases in Michigan.4 25 The
landowner operated a landfill in a corner of this leased land, which
eventually was placed by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) on its national priority list of hazardous waste sites.42 6
Beginning in the 1990s, the EPA set up monitoring wells and took
other actions to remediate the site, including erecting and then later
moving fences that temporarily restricted access by John R. Sand to
parts of its leasehold.42 7 In 1998, the EPA erected permanent fences
that completely and permanently excluded John R. Sand from 42
acres of its leasehold. 8
In 2002, John R. Sand filed suit429 in the United States Court of
Federal Claims under the Tucker Act,43 ° alleging a physical taking
of land for which just compensation is due under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.4 3 1 The government initially asserted the
statute of limitations as an affirmative defense to the claim and
sought dismissal on this ground.4 32 However, based on the more
developed evidentiary record, the government later stipulated that
John R. Sand's claim accrued within the six-year limitations period
after the permanent fence had been installed by the EPA in 1998. 433
Moreover, on later appeal by the plaintiff after trial on the merits
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
government counsel forthrightly conceded at oral argument that the
claim had accrued within the six-year statutory period and thus was
not barred by the statute of limitations.4 34 Nonetheless, and only
over a vigorous dissent, the Federal Circuit raised the statute of
limitations sua sponte, holding that § 2501 "creates a jurisdictional
condition precedent" to suit in the Court of Federal Claims. 43 5 The
425. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1346, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
426. Id. at 1347-48.
427. Id. at 1348-49.
428. See id. at 1347, 1349; John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 556,
560-63 (2004).
429. John R. Sand, 457 F.3d at 1349.
430. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000). On the Tucker Act generally, see supra Part I.B.1 and II.C.2.
431. U.S. CONST. amend. V. On takings claims under the Tucker Act, see supra Part II.C.2.
432. John R. Sand, 457 F.3d at 1349; John R. Sand, 57 Fed. Cl. at 186-93.
433. See John R. Sand, 62 Fed. Cl. at 562-63; see also John R. Sand, 128 S. Ct. at 753
(saying that "the Government effectively conceded that certain claims were timely").
434. John R. Sand, 457 F.3d at 1353.
435. Id. at 1355; but see id. at 1363 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that "it is incorrect

596

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:517

Federal Circuit majority then held that the claim had accrued
earlier when the EPA had placed temporary fences and thus was
time-barred.4 36 The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the
question of whether § 2501 is jurisdictional.4 7
In an opinion by Justice Breyer, a seven-justice majority of the
Court held in John R. Sand that the statute of limitations does have
jurisdictional force, requiring the court to "raise on its own the
timeliness of a lawsuit filed in the Court of Federal Claims, despite
' Stating that "this Court
the Government's waiver of the issue."438
has long interpreted the court of claims limitations statute as
[an] absolute[] kind of limitations period,"43' 9 the
setting forth ...
majority rested its decision solidly and solely on stare decisis.
Acknowledging that the Court previously in Irwin v. Department of
Veterans Affairs44 ° had established a "'rebuttable presumption of
equitable tolling"' for government-related statutes of limitations and
had noted that the Title VII statute of limitations at issue in Irwin
was "linguistically similar to the court of claims statute at issue
here,"44 ' Justice Breyer nonetheless concluded that "these few
swallows cannot make petitioner's summer."44' 2 Because Irwin
involved a different statute of limitations and did not explicitly
overrule the jurisdictional line of cases for § 2501, the Court ruled
that the "definitive earlier interpretation of the statute" in past
sufficient rebuttal" to the general Irwin
precedents "should offer a ...
presumption that a statute of limitations applies for the government
in the same manner as to private defendants.4 43
In describing the petitioner's argument, the majority acknowledged that the Court's more recent decisions may "represent a turn
to accord unique status to § 2501 and hold that it is a limit on 'jurisdiction"').
436. Id. at 1356-60.
437. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2877 (2007).
438. 128 S. Ct. at 752.
439. Id. at 753-54. For further discussion of these earlier precedents reading § 2501 as
jurisdictional, see supra Parts II.B.2 and III.A.
440. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
441. John R. Sand, 128 S. Ct. at 755 (quoting and citing Irwin, 498 U.S. at 94-96).
442. Id.
443. Id. at 756. The majority also turned aside the specific reference to § 2501 as an
"unexceptional" statute of limitations in FranconiaAssociates v.UnitedStates, 537 U.S. 129,
145 (2002), saying that this statement was made in the context of rejecting a special accrual
rule for the government and thus added little to the rejected argument that Irwin had
overruled the earlier jurisdictional line of cases. John R. Sand, 128 S. Ct. at 756.
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in the course of the law," but nonetheless declined to address the
petitioner's position on the text, legislative history, and contemporaneous legal understanding of the statute, saying that "[b]asic
principles of stare decisis ... require us to reject this argument."4 44
The Court appreciated that the contrasting lines of case authority
reinforced by its decision in John R. Sand may create an "anomaly"
in the case-law.4 45 But the majority found that the resulting conflict
was not "critical" and did not produce "'unworkable' law" so as to
4 4 In conclusion,
justify "reexamination of well-settled precedent.""
the Court said, a willingness to overturn a precedent "simply
because we might believe that decision is no longer 'right"' could
"threaten to substitute disruption, confusion, and uncertainty for
'
necessary legal stability."4 47
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, arguing
that the jurisdictional imperative for a statute of limitations in suits
against the government, now reaffirmed by the majority, had been
expressly abandoned in prior decisions, most notably in Irwin.4 48
Justice Stevens insisted that the "decision in Irwin did more than
merely 'mentio[n]"' the earlier jurisdictional precedents, but rather
"expressly declined" to follow them any longer. 44"9 In any event,
Justice Stevens suggested, "ifthere is in fact ambiguity in our cases,
it ought to be resolved in favor of clarifying the law, rather than
preserving an anachronism whose doctrinal underpinnings were
discarded years ago."45 °
Justice Ginsburg also filed a separate dissent, explaining that
even if Irwin had not already discarded the jurisdictional rule for
statutes of limitations, she "would regard this case as an appropriate occasion to revisit those precedents. '451 Agreeing that stare
decisis is an important principle, Justice Ginsburg observed that the
law manifestly has "changed significantly" since that earlier period
in the development of sovereign immunity doctrine, and contended

444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.

John R. Sand, 128 S. Ct. at 756.
Id.
Id. at 756-57.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 757 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 758 (quoting majority opinion at 756).
Id. at 759.
Id. at 759 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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that "[i]t damages the coherence of the law if we cling to outworn
precedent at odds with later, more enlightened decisions. 4 52
C. Diagnosingthe Injury of John R. Sand to Development of a
Coherent Federal Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence
While the John R. Sand decision obviously fails to affirmatively
advance a coherent jurisprudence of sovereign immunity, and
indeed does not pretend to follow the modern trajectory of the case
law, the question remains whether it does any real or lasting harm.
What effect will this reaffirmation of an anachronistic jurisdictional
time bar have on the development of an integrated interpretive
regime for statutory waivers of sovereign immunity? Will this
decision stand as a meaningful obstacle to the realization in the
courts of the promise of justice offered by the legislative directive of
a judicial remedy?
The Court's failure to capitalize on the John R. Sand case as a
perfect opportunity to bring greater cohesion to sovereign immunity
jurisprudence is certainly disappointing. And the Court's invocation
of stare decisis as the reason why the doctrine must be left in a state
of disarray is most unsatisfying. To be sure, the Supreme Court is
generally reluctant to disturb statutory precedents given that
Congress remains empowered to correct any error that it perceives
in the Court's interpretation of a statute. As the Court said in John
R. Sand, "stare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has
'special force,' for 'Congress remains free to alter what we have
done."'453 But even in cases of statutory interpretation, "[s]tare
decisis is not an inexorable command."454 Congressional inaction is
not a sufficient basis to avoid reconsideration of a statutory
precedent when special circumstances warrant a fresh look.455

452. Id. at 760.
453. Id. at 756 (majority opinion) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
172-73 (1989)).
454. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (unanimously overruling statutory
interpretation precedent) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
455. See Patterson,491 U.S. at 175 n.1 (observing that "[i]t is 'impossible to assert with any
degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents' affirmative congressional
approval of the Court's statutory interpretation" (quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S.
616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
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The Court's apparent rejection in Irwin of the nineteenth-century
line of cases imposing jurisdictional status on a statute of limitations456 fits comfortably within the Supreme Court's general
approach to stare decisis in the area of statutory interpretation.
[One] traditional justification for overruling a prior case is that
a precedent may be a positive detriment to coherence and
consistency in the law, either because of inherent confusion
created by an unworkable decision, or because the decision poses
a direct obstacle to the realization of important objectives
embodied in other laws.457
With particular pertinence to the question raised in John R. Sand,
the Irwin Court explained that the "ad hoc" approach to statutes of
limitations applied in past inconsistent decisions had resulted in
"continuing unpredictability without the corresponding advantage
of greater fidelity to the intent of Congress. ' 45 8 Accordingly, Irwin
"cut[] through the tangle of previous decisions '459 and adopted a
general and consistent approach to procedural time limitations on
statutory waivers of sovereign immunity. By retreating from Irwin
and reinstating the previously abandoned jurisdictional decisions in
John R. Sand, even if narrowly confined to a particular statute of
limitations, the Court did little to strengthen the reliability of
precedent generally and tore open a hole in its sovereign immunity
jurisprudence.
Given that similarly worded statutes of limitations remain to be
construed by the federal courts in future cases, the inconsistency in
the case law created by the John R. Sand outcome may become, as
Justice Ginsburg apprehended, "a source of both theoretical
incoherence and practical confusion. 4 6 ° Justice Stevens rightly
feared that the decision might "revive the confusion" of an earlier
456. See supra Parts I.B.3, III.A.
457. Patterson,491 U.S. at 173 (citations omitted).
458. Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94 (1990).
459. See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 647 (1962) (describing Larson v.Domestic &
ForeignCommerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) (plurality opinion), which clarified the doctrine
of federal sovereign immunity and largely abandoned the fiction of a direct suit against a
federal officer as an end-run around sovereign immunity); see also supra note 273.
460. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 750, 760 (2008) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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period in the evolution of sovereign immunity doctrine.4 61 At best,
John R. Sand may come to be understood as accepting what Justice
Stevens called "a carve-out" for specific statutory provisions that
had been the subject of early Supreme Court decisions, notwithstanding that the interpretive approach in those decisions has been
largely abandoned in the modern era.462
Despite the legitimacy of the concerns raised above, the majority opinion in John R. Sand has the considerable virtue of being
forthright in fixing its result squarely and narrowly on stare
decisis46 3 and disclaiming any intent to divert from the path that the
law of federal sovereign immunity has taken in recent decades.
Indeed, even while declining to apply today's more refined interpretive approach, the Court recognized there had been "a turn in the
course of the law," specifically in the interpretation of statutes of
limitations in government cases, which now "place[s] greater
weight upon the equitable importance of treating the Government
like other litigants and less weight upon the special governmental
interest in protecting public funds."4 Older decisions, while
preserved in their specific applications by stare decisis, "have
4 5 which presumably means they
consequently become anomalous,""
will not be extended to new situations or statutes.
Moreover, the John R. Sand majority appeared uneasy with
the classification of the statute of limitations as jurisdictional,
saying only that prior decisions through "convenient shorthand"
had "sometimes referred" to mandatory statutes of limitations as
"jurisdictional."46' 6 The Court instead framed § 2501 as falling into
the category of a "more absolute[] kind of limitations period."4 7
Indeed, two early commentators on the decision argue that the
John R. Sand Court characterized this statute of limitations as
something other than "an actual jurisdictional rule," even though it
461. Id. at 759 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
462. Id. at 758.
463. Indeed, later in the same 2007 term of the Court, Justice Breyer writing for a majority
cited to John R. Sand for the principle that respect for precedent to "achieve legal stability"
should be maintained "whether judicial methods of interpretation change or stay the same."
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008).
464. John R. Sand, 128 S. Ct. at 756 (majority opinion).
465. Id.
466. Id. at 753-54.
467. Id.
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"retains unique rigid characteristics akin to jurisdictional rules,"4 6
although one of those commentators then worried that such a hybrid
approach "may serve to further cloud the line between jurisdiction
and procedure."46' 9
Reading John R. Sand as pulling the jurisdictional punch may be
wishful thinking. While the "convenient shorthand" remark in the
majority opinion does appear disparaging in tone toward use of a
jurisdictional label, the Court holds directly that § 2501 may not be
waived by the parties and also indicates that § 2501 falls outside of
the Irwin presumption allowing equitable tolling of the time period.
A statute of limitations that may not be equitably adjusted, cannot
be waived or forfeited, and must be raised sua sponte by the Court
thus appears to possess those qualities that define a jurisdictional
rule. And, of course, the older decisions preserved by John R. Sand
as a matter of stare decisis used jurisdictional terminology without
reservation.4 7 °
Nonetheless, the majority's reluctance to speak in the language
of jurisdiction, even when simply affirming prior precedent, may
reflect a certain discomfort with the result. At least, the Court may
have been unwilling to say anything that might encourage a general
return to rigid jurisdictional thinking in other cases involving
different statutory waivers of sovereign immunity.
In sum, while John R. Sand remains a lost opportunity to bring
greater coherence to the Court's interpretive approach to statutory
waivers of sovereign immunity, the decision may have little effect
on the general development of the doctrine. Given the singular
grounding of the decision in stare decisis, and in light of the
majority's careful acknowledgment that the general course of the
law has proceeded in a different direction, the John R. Sand opinion

468. Wasserman, supra note 171, at 219; see also Scott Dodson, Three Muted Cheers for
John R. Sand & Gravel, CML PROCEDURE PROF BLOG, Jan. 8, 2008, http://Ilawprofessors.
typepad.com/civpro/2008/O1/dodson-three-mu.html (arguing that John R. Sand refrained the
question as a nonjurisdictional issue and "signaled its willingness to look to middle
paths-that a rule might be nonjurisdictional yet nevertheless have jurisdictional features
such as being unsusceptible to the kind of waiver that took place").
469. Wasserman, supra note 171, at 222.
470. John R. Sand, 128 S. Ct. at 754 (describing prior precedents); see supra Part Il.B.2
(discussing nineteenth-century decisions implying jurisdictional status into the statute of
limitations).
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may kick up a cloud of dust but leave no permanent track marks on
the Supreme Court's federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence.
Except, of course, that the John R. Sand decision has direct and
continuing force for suits brought in the Court of Federal Claims
because it reaffirms the jurisdictional status of the statute of
limitations applicable to such claims. The preservation of such an
anomaly in modern case law is especially disappointing here, as the
Supreme Court has devoted considerable attention and energy
over the past half-century to refining that subcategory of sovereign
immunity jurisprudence covering Tucker Act claims for money
against the federal government in the Court of Federal Claims.4 71 As
discussed earlier, the Court has abandoned early cramped interpretations of the Tucker Act that had effectively removed its authority
over Constitution based money claims, significantly undermined its
availability as a remedy for claims alleging a taking of property
without compensation, and raised a high threshold for establishing
a substantive right to money in a statute that was cognizable as a
Tucker Act claim.47 2 Gradually moving past a strict construction
approach that had treated "suits against the sovereign [as] suspect,
even when allowed,"4'73 the Supreme Court has released the Tucker
Act to become the presumptively available remedy for a taking4 74
and has further clarified that the showing necessary to establish a
substantive right to money relief in a statute-based Tucker Act
claim is "demonstrably lower than the standard for the initial
waiver of sovereign immunity."47 5 Thus, after considerable progress
extending over more than 50 years, the John R. Sand decision
leaves the Tucker Act jurisprudential project woefully incomplete.
Nor does the jurisdictionalization of the statute of limitations
for the Court of Federal Claims leave only a theoretical cavity in the
doctrine without practical consequence. Throughout history and
into the modern era, what is today the Court of Federal Claims has
occupied a central place in the adjudication of suits against the
federal government. The docket of the Court of Federal Claims is
471.
472.
473.
regime
474.
475.

On the Tucker Act as a waiver of sovereign immunity, see supra Part I.B. 1.
See supra Part II.C.2.
Fallon, supra note 3, at 517-18 (telling the "story" of sovereign immunity under a
of strict construction).
See Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 12 (1990).
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472-73 (2003).
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varied, although all of the claims that it hears are, in one form or
another, claims against the sovereign United States:
About one-third of the COFC's cases involve contract claims
against the government. Another one-quarter or so of its cases
are tax refund suits against the government. Yet another major
portion of the COFC's docket consists of cases in which civilian
employees or members of the military sue the government over
pay. Also large in number, as well as doctrinal importance, are
cases involving claims that the government has taken the
plaintiffs property without paying the "just compensation"
required by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Smaller
in number, but of historical and political importance, are claims
brought against the government by Native Americans and
disputes referred to the COFC by Congress. The COFC also
hears claims against the United States for patent infringement
and copyright infringement and for rights in protected plant
varieties.476
As of September 30, 2007, 7815 cases (including hundreds of
contract, civilian and military pay, and takings cases) were pending
before the Court of Federal Claims;4 77 during 2007, claims were filed
seeking some $25.6 billion and judgments were entered for more
than $2.7 billion.47 8
Imposing a duty on the judges of the Court of Federal Claims (and
the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit which hears appeals from that court) to investigate the
timeliness of these thousands of suits and consider when a claim
accrues or should have been discovered-even when the government
has conceded the point-unnecessarily adds to the burdens on the
judiciary and pointlessly expands the subjects for litigation.
Moreover, it deprives the parties of the ability to decide which
476. Richard H. Seamon, The Provenanceof the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,
71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 543, 548-49 (2003).
477. ANNUAL REPORT OFTHE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 305 tbl.G-2A (2007) (U.S. Court of Federal
Claims-Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending for the 12-Month Period Ending September
30, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/appendices/GO2ASepO7.pdf.
478. Id. at 306 tbl.G-2B (U.S. Court of Federal Claims-Judgments and Appeals for the 12Month Period Ending September 30,2007), availableat httpJ/www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/
appendices/G02BSepO7.pdf.
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issues should be litigated or instead may be waived or forfeited.
And, not incidentally, if the government lawyer's deliberate
concession of the issue is later revisited because a jurisdictional
matter cannot be waived, the reversal of position undermines the
trust of the citizenry in the integrity of their government. In sum,
for many reasons, as discussed previously,4 79 it is unhealthy for an
adjudicatory system to unnecessarily embed statutory provisions in
jurisdictional bedrock.
Finally, as a matter of practical justice, construing a statute of
limitations as jurisdictional and thus immunizing the federal
government from the consequences of its waiver or forfeiture of the
time bar is least justifiable when the government is defending the
case before the Court of Federal Claims. To deny jurisdictional
status to the statute of limitations is not to open the door to stale
and untimely claims nor denigrate the importance of diligent
presentation of claims against the federal government. When a
claim is arguably untimely, the government is quite capable of so
asserting. As the plethora of cases that are publicly reported
demonstrate, the government has hardly been shy or timid in
asserting statutes of limitations when faced with affirmative claims
of liability. Rather than presenting a particularly poignant case for
protection of the public fisc from inadvertent waiver of government
defenses, a claim against the government in the Court of Federal
Claims is least likely to fall between the cracks or receive inferior
attention from government counsel. Even within the prevailing
centralization of litigating authority for civil suits involving the
federal government under the Attorney General,4 8 litigation of
cases against the United States before the Court of Federal Claims
is closely and directly managed at Main Justice in Washington,
D.C., where such litigation is handled by trial attorneys with
expertise in the particular category of case and forum for adjudication.481
479. See supra Part II.A-B.2.
480. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (2000).
481. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.45(b) (2007) (assigning most Court of Federal Claims matters to the
Civil Division of the Department of Justice); 28 C.F.R. § 0.65(a)-(b) (assigning, inter alia,
public lands and Indian law matters to the Environment and Natural Resources Division of
the Department of Justice). On assignment of litigation matters within the Department of
Justice, see generally SISK, supra note 58, § 1.02(d), at 9-11.
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Indeed, in the John R. Sand case itself,4" 2 the government did
question the timeliness of the lawsuit and litigated that question
before the Court of Federal Claims. Only subsequently and based
upon the evidence developed before the trial court did the government abandon its objection and concede on appeal that the claim
had accrued within the statute of limitations. With the government
having made a deliberate decision not to persevere in suggesting the
application of a time limitation to this lawsuit, no principle of
solicitude for a public defendant or interest of just adjudication of
claims against the sovereign justifies allowing a court to set aside
that concession and readjudicate an issue apparently resolved to the
satisfaction of the government.
CONCLUSION

Over the past 150 years, Congress has gradually and sometimes
haltingly, but with progressive expansiveness and generosity,
lowered the shield of federal sovereign immunity. Even when
Congress has waived federal sovereign immunity by enacting
legislation expressly granting permission to seek judicial relief
against the government, however, the immunity doctrine exerts a
persistent influence upon the statutory analysis that attends
adjudication of claims under these statutes.
For several decades now, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
statutory waivers of sovereign immunity has been traveling away
from a petrified regime of jurisdictional absolutes and wooden strict
construction. Today, the Court directs a more nuanced reading of
such statutes to both protect important government interests
identified by Congress and uphold the statutory promise of the
judicial remedy, with careful attention to text, context, history, and
statutory purpose elevated above mechanical application of
presumptions.
Within the Court's coalescing jurisprudence, each canon of
statutory interpretation had found a place on board the ship but
also had been fixed more securely in its proper place within the
vessel. Jurisdictional analysis remains a part of the stern, built
upon the general scope of the waiver, but no longer mires every
482. On the litigation history of the John R. Sand case, see supra Part III.B.
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aspect of statutory interpretation in nonwaivable and inflexible
absolutes. Strict construction is still the rudder that prevents the
ship from tacking too far to port by adding new claims and forms of
relief beyond those expressly allowed by Congress, but this rubric
no longer leans the ship constantly to starboard in narrowing the
remedy afforded by Congress. Overall, the regime of interpretation
for statutory waivers of sovereign immunity is no longer waterlogged by obdurate presumptions that failed to effectively balance
important public policy limitations incorporated in the statute with
pursuit of justice for governmental wrongdoing as intended by
Congress.
Just as federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence was coming
safely into the harbor and the anchor was being lowered, however,
the Supreme Court's recent decision in John R. Sand & Gravel Co.
v. United States48 may have pushed the ship back out into the
pitching waves. Fortunately, the Court did not appear to fight the
current of the modern case law, so the strength of the jurisprudential tide may still bring the ship into its anchorage. In future
decisions, the Court should speak more purposively to the question
of interpretive approach if the renewed drift in its federal sovereign
immunity jurisprudence is to be arrested.

483. 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008).

